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ABSTRACT 
U.S. and t h e  S o v i e t  TJnion resumed n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  c o n t r o l  i n t e r m e d i a t e -  
range n u c l e a r  weapons i n  November 1981 a f t e r  a  r e c e s s  of about a  y e a r .  The U.S. 
proposed a so -ca l l ed  " z e r o  op t ion"  which would e l i m i n a t e  a l l  deployments of 
American and S o v i e t  in te rmedia te - range  n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e s .  The S o v i e t  Union 's  
main p roposa l  would reduce a l l  in te rmedia te - range  n u c l e a r  weapons ( i n c l u d i n g  
m i s s i l e s  and a i r c r a f t )  in tended f o r  use  i n  Europe t o  300 u n i t s  f o r  each s i d e  by 
1990. I s s u e s  i n c l u d e :  ( 1 )  what weapons should b e  inc luded  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ;  
( 2 )  should a l l  weapons i n  a  c a t e g o r y  be  inc luded  o r  on ly  t h o s e  deployed i n  t h e  
r e g i o n  o f  Europe; ( 3 )  what a c c o u n t ,  i f  a n y ,  should be t a k e n  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
of in te rmedia te - range  weapons o f  B r i t a i n ,  F r a n c s  and China? 
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I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
N e g o t i a t i o n s  between t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and t h e  S o v i e t  Union t o  c o n t r o l  what 
t h e  U.S. c a l l s  " in te rmedia te - range  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s "  (INF) and what t h e  S o v i e t s  c a l l  
"medium-range means" began on November 30,  1981. They fol lowed a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  
i n t r o d u c t c r y  t a l k s  on " t h e a t e r "  n t i c l ea r  weapons i n  t h e  f a l l  of  1980 d u r i n g  t h e  
C a r t e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  
I n  December 1979 t h e  North  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  Organizal-ion adop ted  a s o - c a l l e d  
"two t r a c k "  d e c i s i o n ,  f i r s t ,  t o  dep loy  i n  Europe 572 i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  
c a p a b l e  o f  s t r i k i n g  t a r g e t s  deep w i t h i n  t h e  European a r e a  c ~ f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union,  
and,  second,  t o  seek  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  U.S.S.R. t o  r educe  o r  e l i m i n a t e  such 
m i s s i l e s  from t h e  deployments of b o t h  s i d e s .  
One of  t h e  main r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  NATO d e c i s i o n  t o  dep loy  i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e  
m i s s i l e s ,  which had n o t  been p a r t  of  NATO's armament p r e v i o u s l y ,  was t o  c o u n t e r  
t h e  newest g e n e r a t i o n  of deployed S o v i e t  weapons w i t h  range  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  
s t r i k i n g  a l l  of Western Europe.  These were t h e  SS-20 b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  and t h e  
B a c k f i r e  bombers. For  r easons  of  d e f e n s e  and p o h i t i c s ,  NATO s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  adop ted  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  s e e k  a n  arms c o n t r o l  agreement on i n t e r m e d i a t e - r z n g e  weapons. 
11. Reasons for the 1979 NATO Decision 
A. The Decision to Oeploy Nuclear Missiles 
The December 12, 1979, NATO decision was to modernize the alliance's theater 
nuclear forces by the deployment of 572 single warhead missiles: 108 Pershing 2 
missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), both still under 
development by the United States. All 108 Pershing 2s and 96 GLCMs were to be 
deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 160 GLCXs in the United Kingdom, 112 
GLCMs in Italy, and 48 GLCMs each in Belgium and the Netherlands. All were to he 
completely under U.S. command and control. 
The Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands have since shown reluctance to 
base the GLCMs on their territory. There is no current plan to redistribute any 
of the missiles if one or more NATO governments should decide not to accept them. 
Since the official initial deployment date for the missiles will not occur until 
December 1983 or early 1984, this question is not immediate. - I /  
A conventional explanation for the 1979 NATO decision to place the Pershing 
2s and GLCMs in Europe is that the West German Government and other NATO govern- 
ments were concerned that the advent of strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. 
~ n d  the U.S.S.R. undermined the reliability of the American Government's commit- 
ment to use strategic forces as a deterrent of Soviet aggression against NATO 
Europe. The deployment of U.S. nuclear forces to Western Europe capable of 
striking targets in the Soviet Union would link the defense of NATO Europe to 
1/ The question of the internal political contrwersies over deployment of 
the mTssiles in the countries which initially agreed to receive them is critically 
important. Domestic resistance could end up frustrating the December 1979 deploy- 
ment decision. This subject is discussed in Stanley Sloan, NATO Theater Nuclear 
Forces: Modernization and Arms Control Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 
Number IB 81128, 1982, and in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO Today: 
The Alliance in Evolution, Staff Report (Committee Print) April 1982. 
the 1J.S. s t r a t e g i c  d e t e r r e n t ,  thus  guarantee ing  t h a t  it would have an impact on 
decis ion-makers  i n  Moscow. Defensive s t r i k e s  hy the  U.S. nuc lea r  fo rces  i n  Europe 
aga ins t  Sovie t  t e r r i t o r y  would e n t a i l ,  Europeans be l ieved ,  r e t a l i a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t he  
U.S. homeland. Thus the  purpose of "coupling" the U.S. s t r a t e g i c  d e t e r r e n t  t o  t h e  
NATO d e t e r r e n t  would he achieved. 
Another reason was t h a t  t he  new weapons were needed t o  ca r ry  out  a  s i g n i f i -  
can t  phase of t h e  " f l e x i b l e  response" d o c t r i n e  of NATO, t h a t  i s ,  t o  be ab l e  t o  
meet e f f e c t i v e l y  Sovie t  a t t a c k  on any l e v e l ,  and no t  t o  permit " e s c a l a t i o n  domin- 
ance" t o  the  Soviet  Union a t  the  intermediate-range l e v e l .  E x i s t i n g  in te rmedia te -  
range s t r i k e  fo rces  of NATO--mainly U.S. and B r i t i s h  bombing a i r c r a f t - - w e r e  ag ing  
and becoming r e l a t i v e l y  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e .  The West Germans and o t h e r s  wanted the  
intermediate-range t h e a t e r  nuc lear  m i s s i l e s  deployed i n  defense of NATO t o  counter  
t he  new Sovie t  t h e a t e r  forces  coming onto the  scene--SS-20 m i s s i l e s  and Backf i re  
bombers. The former e s p e c i a l l v  were thought t o  he much more formidable t h r e a t s  t o  
NATO Europe than the  Soviet  m i s s i l e s  deployed ea r l i e r - - the  SS-4s and SS-5s. The 
SS-20s have th ree  M I R V  warheads, a r e  more accu ra t e ,  mobile and with a  longer  range. 
They thus possess  an improved d e f e n s i b i l i t y  and warf ight ing  c a p a b i l i t y .  Without 
t he  new U.S. weapons NATO would be d e f i c i e n t  a t  t he  intermediate-range l e v e l  t o  
meet a Soviet  o f f ens ive .  
Another approach, however, was r epo r t ed ly  taken by some lJ.S. o f f i c i a l s  who 
'r 
were l e s s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  counterbalancing the  new Soviet  long-range t h e a t e r  weapons 
% .  
o r  i n  r e s t o r i n g  NATO's f l e x i b l e  response c a p a b i l i t y  than  they  were i n  posing a  new 
' 'credible"  nuc lear  t h r e a t  t o  the  Soviet  Union, namely, a  new s e t  of weapons t h a t  
could s t r i k e  the Soviet  Union's t e r r i t o r y  and h i t  v i t a l  m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s .  2 /  They - 
.--------- 
2 /  U . S .  Senate Committee i n  Foreign Re la t ions ,  In t e r im  Report on Nuclear - 
Weapons <n Europk, Prepared bC the North A t l a n t i c  Assembly's Spec ia l  Committee on 
Nuclear Weapons i n  Europe (Committee j ~ r i n t ) ,  December 1981, pp. 14-16. 
I I 
bel ieved  t h a t  NATO should have an intermediate-range nuc lear  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  rub- 
s t a n t i a l  p ropor t ions  i n  o rde r  t o  c a r r y  ou t  wa r f igh t ing  missions f o r  which NATO 
was not  prepared e i t h e r  i n  d o c t r i n e  o r  i n  weaponry. These would r e q u i r e  an a b i l -  
i t y  a f t e r  absorbing an  i n i t i a l  Sovie t  a t t a c k ,  t o  respond with e f f e c t i v e  pover 
a g a i n s t  Sovie t  o f f ens ive  weaponry and f a c i l i t i e s .  To do t h i s  they he l ieved  t h a t  
NATO should have considerably more than the  572 m i s s i l e s  planned under t h e  1979 
dec is ion .  
It i s  ev ident  t h a t  such a NATO warf igh t ing  c a p a b i l i t y ,  vhe the r  with 572 de- 
ployed missiles o r  with s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more, could i n  e f f e c t  c o n s t i t u t e  an arm of 
American s t r a t e g i c  power. The t a r g e t s  i n  t h e  Sovie t  Union of the  Europe-deployed 
m i s s i l e s  would be among t h e  same t a r g e t s  of U.S. ICBMs,  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  have con 
ceded. So the  European m i s s i l e s  could s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  ICBMs, o r  vice-versa.  The 
Soviet  Union has  made c l e a r  t h a t  i t  regards  the  U.S. m i s s i l e s  i n  Europe a s  an  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t r a t e g i c  arm of  grave p o t e n t i a l  danger t o  i t s e l f  because i t  deems them 
t o  be f i r s t - s t r i k e  weapons. 
A s  recounted above, a p r i n c i p a l  reason f o r  t he  d e c i s i o n  t o  deploy intermediate-  
range missiles i n  NATO Europe was t o  calm European f e a r s  t h a t  t h e  1J.S. n i q h t  be  un- 
w i l l i n g  t o  respond with i t e  s t r a t e g i c  fo rces  t o  a major Sovie t  a t t a c k  on Europe, 
More immediately, the  European anx ie ty  was not  t h a t  Soviet  fo r ce s  would a t t a c k  
Western Europe, but might t r y  t o  t ake  p o l i t i c a l  advantage of a perception of U.S. 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y  and of weakness i n  i t s  c o m i t a e n t  t o  NATO Europe, and "blackmailn 
t h e  NATO governments. I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  new American deployments were i n  p a r t  to  fur- 
f i l l  a p o l i t i c a l  o b i e c t i v e  of  s t rengthening  European morale and reao lve  i n  t h e  
f ace  of t he  new Sovie t  o f f ens ive  power. 
The v a l i d i t y  of t h i s  component i n  t h e  NATO d e c i s i o n  t o  deploy t h e  ZNF veapons 
i s  open t o  debate .  The deployment of Pershing 2s and GLCYs t o  NATO Europe is 
- 5 -  
based on a  West European b e l i e f  t h a t  these  1J.S.-controlled weapons a r e  more l i k e l y  
I; 
t o  be f i r e d  i n  response t o  a  Soviet  a t t a c k  on Western Europe than a r e  t he  U.S. 
s t r a t e g i c  weapons based i n  the con t inen ta l  U.S. Rut i f  
U.S. dec i s ion  t o  f i r e  t he  Europe-based m i s s i l e s  a r e  t h e  
1J.S.-based m i s s i l e s ,  namely, Soviet  nuc lear  r e t a l i a t i o n  
t h e  conskquencks of the  
same a s  those f o r  f i r i n g  
aga ins t  the  c o n t i n e n t a l  
U.S,, then  why would 1J.S. wil l ingness--or  reluctance--be d i f f e r e n t  i n  e i t h e r  one 
. - 0  
~f  these  dec i s ions?  That can be one l o g i c a l  ana lys is . '  The Europeans, however, 
P" * ' I > *  s ,. ' * * ; t  % 
- t h i n k  more i n  terms of de t e r r ence  than of warf ight ing  and many t h e r e f o r e  bk l i eve  
4 .  . - .  . * i ,  
t h a t  the  Soviet  Union i s  b e t t e r  d e t e r r e d  by the  v i s i h ' i l - i t y  of i i s $ ~ i e s  i n  Europe 
- 9 A. 411 
than by those i n  t h e  U.S. The demonstrat ions a g a i n s t  t h e  m i s s i l e s  
coun t r i e s  a r e  evidence, however, t h a t  the  deployment plans do not  r ea s su re  every 
v 
one. 
R. The Arms Control Decision 
While the NATO dec iq ion  to, deplpy n$w inQrrned\afe-rz+&ge s y s t m s  r e s t e d  on 
c e r t a i n  independent mi l i ta , ry  con$,iderations,  t he re  were o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  as, welJ a s  
p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  led  t h e  NATO governments t o  t h e i r  s i m u l t a n e ~ ~ . . d ~ c i s i o n  t o  
p u r s u e  nego t i a t i ons  wi th  the  M v i e t  Union t o  lhit interrnediatpwgnge n r x l e a r  sys- 
tems. NATO and U.S. o f f i c i a l s  have s t r e s s e d  t h a t  both t r a c k s  of t h e  19,79~r@cision 
werg of equal  importance. As recounted above, one o b j e c t i v e  of  NATO o f f i c i a l s ,  
especi,aLly i n  ,West Germany, was t o  counterbalance the, Sovie t  I N F  t h r e a t  by the  
de$?i$ion t o  deqloy U,S, INF. m i s s i l e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  they intended t o  use the  
planned NATO deploy me*^^ pg, w g o t i a t e  a removal. o r  r educ t ion  of t he  Sovie t  i n t e r -  
mediate-range m i s s i l e  th rea t4  Without the  deployment dec i s ion  NATO would have had 
l i t t l e  o r  no c h a n ~ e ~ o f  p q w t i a t i n q  succes s fu l ly  t o  remove o r  reduce the  Sovie t  mis- 
s i l e  c a p a b i l i t y .  A s . E b g m  Rostaw dec lared  t o  t he  House Foreign A f f a i r s  Committee, 
on February 2 3 ,  1982, "Our a l l i e s . . . a r e  i n  asreement with us  t h a t  p repa ra t ions  f o r  
deployment must go forward and that...we must demonstrate that we are prepared to 
carry out our program, including the beginning of deployments in 1983, unlers 
there is a negotiating result that makes deployment unnecessary. Without that 
clear determination, the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate seriously." 
In the context of the U.S. and NATO proposal for the "zero option", therefore, 
a purpose of the deployment decision is to achieve success in negotiating dirman- 
tleunt of the Soviet intermediate-range miseiles. If this negotiation rucceedr, 
then the NATO deployment will be terminated. On the other hand, if the negotia- 
tionm fail, NATO has expressed its determination to proceed with the missile de- 
ployment, because as indicated previously, there are other compelling rearons for 
doing so. 
In addition to these military factors, there were also political motives for 
the decision to negotiate for reduction of intermediate-range missiles. They in- 
c lude : 
1. Many in NATO did not wish East-West relations to be damaged any more than 
necerrary by the deployment decision. By itself and without ameliorating element8 
the deployrent could embitter relations with the Soviet Union. More concretely 
it might lead to an araas conrpetition that could be costly and in the end not add 
to NATO recurity. 
2. lor soare years the NATO alliance had managed its relation8 with k r c w  on 
the twin principles of "defense and detente." This dual guidance illuminated MATO 
conduct in general and was accepted as appropriate in this significant instance. 
3. noreover, an influential segment of daestic opinion, especially in key 
countries like Western Gemany, Belgium and the Netherlands, needed to be perruaded 
that s o w  concomitant action would be taken to condition the military decision, if 
porsible, in order to make it politically more acceptable at home. 
Foundat ions  f o r  t h e  December 1979 d e c i s i o n  on arms c o n t r o l  had been l a i d  by a  
S p e c i a l  Group s e t  up by NATO t o  examine t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  such a  d e c i s i o n .  I t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  c e r t a i n  p r i n c i p l e s  t o  gu ide  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  be  conducted by t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  and t h e s e  were approved by t h e  NATO M i n i s t e r s .  They included--  
1. The n e g o t i a t i o n s  shou ld  proceed on a s t ep -by-s tep  b a s i s ,  focus -  
i n g  f i r s t  on reduc ing  t h e  S o v i e t  m i s s i l e  f o r c e - - e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  SS-20s. 
A i r c r a f t  shou ld  n o t  be  inc luded  i n i t i a l l y  i n  o r d e r  n o t  t o  make t h e  nego- 
t i a t i o n s  t o o  complex. The S o v i e t  B a c k f i r e  bomber was n o t e d  a s  a  s p e c i a l  
problem which should  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  p r e f e r a b l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of n e g o t i a -  
t i o n s  f o r  SALT 111. The n e g o t i a t i o n s  would have t o  be  conducted w i t h i n  
a  SALT 111 framework. (The demise o f  SALT I1 was n o t  then  e x p e c t e d ) .  
2 .  L i m i t a t i o n s  should  a p p l y  t o  worldwide i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e  sys tems 
w i t h  s u b c e i l i n g s  on t h o s e  i n  s t r i k i n g  range  of  NATO. It was assumed t h a t  
n o t  a l l  sys tems would be e l i m i n a t e d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  t h e  so-  
c a l l e d  "ze ro  o p t i o n "  was acknowledged. T h e r e f o r e  a t  some p o i n t  some ad- 
jus tment  would have t o  be made i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  dep loy  INF sys tems .  Rut 
t h e  e x a c t  numbers o f  SS-20s and NATO systems t h a t  could  h e  t o l e r a t e d  was 
n o t  dec ided  . 
3 .  E q u a l i t y  i n  c e i l i n g s  and r i g h t s  shou ld  b e  a s s u r e d  i n  t h e  
agreement.  
4 .  The agreement shou ld  b e  v e r i f i a b l e .  
111. The U.S. Proposal f o r  INF Negotiat ions 
Soon a f t e r  the  December 1979 dec i s ions  by NATO the  T7.S. approached the  Sovie t  
Union t o  make arrangements f o r  arms con t ro l  t a l k s .  Moscow a t  f i r s t  reneged, de- 
manding t h a t  NATO drop i t s  dec is ion  t o  deploy intermediate-range m i s s i l e s  a s  a  con- 
d i t i o n  f o r  nego t i a t i ons .  In  J u l y  1980 Pres ident  Rrezhnev t o l d  Chancellor Schmidt 
of West Germany t h a t  i t  dropped i t s  p recondi t ions  and was ready t o  arrange neqot ia-  
t i ons .  By Septemher, the  1J.S. and the  U.S.S.R. agreed t o  meet i n  Geneva beginning 
October 17, 1980. The se s s ion  l a s t e d  u n t i l  November 17, 1980. By t h a t  time the  
n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  had produced a  new Pres ident  with a  d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  arms 
con t ro l  who would e n t e r  o f f i c e  i n  January 1981. The 1980 sees ion  was of l i t t l e  
cont inuing s ign i f i cance .  
The Reagan Administrat ion wished t o  reexamine arms con t ro l  po l icy  i n  t he  l i g h t  
of i t s  own philosophy and t o  prepare i t s  own nego t i a t i ng  pos i t ions .  Ry September 
1981 Secre ta ry  of S t a t e  Haig and Foreign Minis te r  Gromvko had agreed t h a t  t a l k s  
could begin November 30, 1981, i n  Geneva. Pres ident  Reaaan on November 18, 1981, 
a t  t he  National  P re s s  Club, s e t  f o r t h  t h e  NATO-approved U.S. proposal  f o r  the  nego- 
t i a t i o n s .  The Pres ident  dec lared ,  "The United S t a t e s  i s  prepared t o  cancel  i t s  
1;eployment of Pershing I1 and ground-launch c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  i f  t h e  Sov ie t s  w i l l  
d ismantle  t h e i r  SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 mis s i l e s . "  
This  simply worded proposal was e l abo ra t ed  i n  a  d r a f t  t r e a t y  presented t o  t he  
conference. The d r a f t  has not  been made publ ic .  
The t rade  of fered  by the  United S t a t e s ,  with t he  backing of NATO, was simple. 
The Soviet  deployments--now about 300 SS-20s and about 300-350 SS-4s and SS-5s--no 
mat te r  where loca ted ,  would be dismantled and the 1T.S. would "cancel deployment" of 
Pershing 2s o r  GLCYs. Deployment of the 1J.S. m i s s i l e s  was scheduled t o  begin near 
the  end of 1983 o r  e a r l y  i n  1954. 
U.S. o f f i c i a l s  have not  o f f e r e d  any a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h i s  proposal .  They have 
s a i d  they have no f a l l b a c k  p o s i t i o n  and have d iscussed  none wi th  NATO. However, 
they have promised t o  n e g o t i a t e  f a i r l y  and s a i d  t hey  a r e  ready t o  l i s t e n  t o  any 
counterproposal .  
Many observers  and o f f i c i a l s  in  t h e  NATO c o u n t r i e s  a r e  doubt fu l  t h a t  t h e  
Sovie t  Union w i l l  t r a d e  o f f  over 600 e x i s t i n g  m i s s i l e s  wi th  about 1200 warheads 
f o r  572 non-exis tent  U.S. m i s s i l e s  wi th  572 warheads. They concede t h a t  a com- 
promise a t  some l e v e l  above zero  would be a  more reasonable  expec t a t i on .  
But another  po in t  of  view h a s  been advanced by Paul Warnke, former ACDA D i -  
r e c t o r  and prominent U.S. spokesman f o r  arms c o n t r o l  causes .  Warnke has  dec l a r ed  
t h a t  h e  f avo r s  t h e  "zero option" because t h e  Sov ie t  Union i s  very  much a f r a i d  of 
Pershing 2s  and ground-launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s .  Consequently,  he t h inks  t h a t  a  
r e s u l t  can be nego t i a t ed  c l o s e  t o  t h e  zero op t ion ,  i f  n o t  t h e  zero o p t i o n  i t s e l f .  
Ye s a i d  t h a t  evidence of Soviet  concern about such weapons i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  they 
t r i e d  very  hard t o  g e t  them included i n  t h e  SALT 11 Trea ty ,  3 /  Eviden t ly  he  was - 
r e f e r r i n g  t o  t he  nego t i a t i ons  aimed a t  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  deployment of  GLCMs. This  
was incorpora ted  i n  t h e  pro tocol  t o  t h e  t r e a t y  t h e  t e rmina l  d a t e  ( ~ e c e m b e r  31, 
1981) of which has  now passed. On t h i s  b a s i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  he argued,  t he  S o v i e t s  
should be  w i l l i n g  t o  dismantle  t h e i r  SS-20s. 
ACDA Di rec to r  Eugene Rostow has  cha rac t e r i zed  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  "zero opt ion" 
proposal  a s  one f o r  "unequal r educ t ions  t o  achieve equal  r e s u l t s . "  He acknowledged, 
" t h e r e ' s  no way of expec t ing  t h e  Sovie t  Union t o  accept  those  proposa ls  w i t h i n  t h e  
parameters o f  t he  nuc l ea r  equa t ion  a s  such." But he dec l a r ed  t h a t  looking a t  t h e  
problem "in the  l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  s e t t i n g "  t h e r e  would be "very powerful 
3/  New York Times, March 21, 1982. (Text of deba te  between Warnke and 
ROS to;) 
f o r c e s  t h a t  should  induce t h e  S o v i e t  Union t o  want a  pe r iod  of s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  West." - 41 
The phi losophy revea led  by Rostow's e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  U.S. p r o p o s a l ,  i s  one 
t h a t  h a s  been t y p i c a l  o f  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  approach t o  n u c l e a r  arms 
c o n t r o l .  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s  have contended t h a t  t h e  U.S. d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  
proceed w i t h  new weapons programs, even though i t  does n o t  have t h e  weapons i n  
hand,  would b e  enough t o  induce t h e  S o v i e t  Union t o  agree  t o  s u r r e n d e r  i t s  a l l e g e d  
s t r a t e g i c  s u p e r i o r i t y .  It i s  t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  Moscow would be r e l u c t a n t  t o  engage 
i n  a  c o s t l y  arms r a c e  which it could n o t  win. 
One of t h e  problems w i t h  t h i s  approach i s  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union i s  s e n s i t i v e  
about appearances  and i t  h a s  r e p e a t e d l y  spoken i n  terms of e q u a l i t y  i n  such a  way 
a s  t o  convey t h e  impress ion t h a t  i t  does n o t  want t o  appear  a s  making unequal con- 
c e s s i o n s .  Second, t h e  S o v i e t s  have a l s o  made it abundant ly  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e y  do no t  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  ba lance  i n  Europe i s  simply one of Persh ing  2 s  and GLCMs v e r s u s  
SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s. It a l s o  i n v o l v e s  o t h e r  medium-range systems. So t h e  
r e s u l t ,  which Rostow would c o n s i d e r  e q u a l ,  t h e  S o v i e t  Union does n o t  r ecognize  t o  
be equa l .  It has  r e j e c t e d  t h e  "zero op t ion"  proposed by t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  on t h e  
grounds t h a t  it would upse t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  ba lance  i n  Europe t o  t h e  d i sadvan tage  
of t h e  U.S.S.R. 
4 /  New York Times, March 21,  1982. I b i d .  - 
IV. The S o v i e t  P r o p o s a l s  f o r  INF N e g o t i a t i o n s  --
The  Rostow t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union cou ld  be w i l l i n g  t o  a c q u i e s c e  i n  a  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  armaments i n  o r d e r  t o  reach  a  more s t a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  h a s  some s l i g h t  c o n f i r m a t i o n  from Rrezhnev 
h i m s e l f .  The S o v i e t  l e a d e r  t o l d  Der S p i e g e l  magazine i n  Nolrember 1981 t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  Union i n  t h e  SALT I1 T r e a t y  was w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  numbers o f  
deployed weapons b i g g e r  t h a n  t h e  U.S. i n  o r d e r  f o r  b o t h  s i d e s  t o  a r r i v e  a t  p a r i t y .  
It  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  SALT 11 T r e a t y  o b l i g a t e d  t h e  U.S.S.R. t o  make l a r g e r  r e -  
d u c t i o n s  i n  e x i s t i n g  f o r c e s  t h a n  t h e  U.S. b u t  t h a t  does n o t  a s s u r e  t h a t  h e  o r  o t h e r  
S o v i e t  l e a d e r s  w i l l  a s s e n t  t o  unequal r e d u c t i o n s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  It w i l l  depend 
g r e a t l y  on t h e  c o n t e x t  of t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and t h e  e n t i r e  p a t t e r n  of mutual  con- 
c e s s i o n s .  P r e s i d e n t  Brezhnev h a s  expressed  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  make l a r g e  r e d u c t i o n s  
i n  arms bu t  n o t  i n  a  r a t i o  d i sadvan tageous  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. I n  t h e  INF bar -  
g a i n i n g  t h u s  f a r  Brezhnev h a s  advocated formulae  weighted a g a i n s t  t h e  U.S. and i n  
t h e  S o v i e t  f a v o r .  
Rrezhnev, e a r l y  on,  proposed t h a t  from t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  (Novem- 
b e r  30, 1981) b o t h  s i d e s  should observe  a  moratorium on deployments o f  medium- 
range  m i s s i l e s  and o t h e r  systems u n t i l  a  t r e a t y  was concluded.  T h i s  p roposa l  d a t e d  
from 1979 and was r e i t e r a t e d  by Brezhnev a t  t h e  26th  Communist P a r t y  Congress i n  
February 1981. 
The U.S. and NATO d i d  n o t  t h i n k  t h i s  would h e  an e q u i t a b l e  arrangement because  
t h e  1J.S.S.R. i n  1981 a l r e a d y  had more t h a n  200 SS-20s deployed.  These would n o t  
be reduced o r  e l i m i n a t e d  by t h e  moratorium b u t  t h e  1J.S. m i s s i l e  deployments would 
be blocked.  
The S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a  moratorium seemed more o f  a  p o l i t i c a l  a r row aimed 
a t  Western European op in ion  t h a n  a  s e r i o u s  o r o p o s a l .  More i n d i c a t i v e  of Brezhnev ' s  
a t t i t u d e  toward the  forthcoming nego t i a t i ons  were c e r t a i n  genera l  p r i n c i p l e s  he 
supported.  Brezhnev s a i d  h e  wanted t h e  nego t i a t i ons  t o  be based on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of p a r i t y  and equal  s e c u r i t y .  He a l s o  wanted t o  lower " the l e v e l  of conf ronta t ion ."  
And h e  added, ". . .we s h a l l  be prepared t o  agree on r a t h e r  s u b s t a n t i a l  reduc t ions  
from both s ides ."  
I n  February 1982, TASS, t h e  Sovie t  news agency, issued i n  Engl ish a review of 
t h e  INF nego t i a t i ons  desc r ib ing  the  Soviet  Government's r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  U . S .  pro- 
posa l  and presen t ing  a  new Sovie t  proposal .  The TASS r e l e a s e  denounced t h e  U.S. 
I I zero opt ion" p lan  a s  " u n r e a l i s t i c "  and not  s e r ious .  It branded t h a t  p a r t  of t he  
proposal which  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  of  medium-range m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  Eas t e rn  
U.S .S .R.  a s  "having nothing whatsoever i n  common with t he  problem of nuc lear  weapons 
i n  Europe." Refer r ing  t o  i t s  ve r s ion  of  the  numerical balance of medium-range 
weapons i n  Europe, TASS claimed t h a t  t he  U.S. proposal would upset  the  e x i s t i n g  
medium-range nuc lear  balance i n  Europe and give NATO a  lop-sided advantage. - 5 /  
The Soviet  Union, TASS s a i d ,  is  prepared t o  agree on a  r e a l  "zero option",  a  
t o t a l  renuncia t ion  by both s i d e s  of a l l  medium-range nuclear  weapons t r a ined  on 
t a r g e t s  i n  Europe, and moreover, a l l  t a c t i c a l  nuc lear  weapons a s  wel l .  This  pro- 
pqsal  would c r e a t e  a nuc lear - f ree  zone i n  Europe. 
Recognizing the  extreme na tu re  of t he  proposal ,  TASS o f f e r ed  an a l t e r n a t i v e .  
"If", TASS s a i d ,  "the West i s  not  prepared f o r  such a  r a d i c a l  so lu t ion , "  then  the  
Soviet  Union had another  proposal .  It o f f e r ed  an agreement along the  fol lowing 
l i n e s  : 
(1) It must include a l l  medium-range nuclear  weapons, t h a t  i s ,  
those with a combat r ad ius  of 1000 k i lometers  o r  more, deployed i n  
Europe, i n  ad jacent  waters  o r  intended f o r  use i n  Europe. 
5 1  Moscow Broadcast TASS i n  Engl i sh ,  February 9,  1982,  (FBIS). Also see  
below, "The R a t t l e  of the  Numbers," p. 21. 
( 2 )  Both sides, each with approximately 1000 weapons, should 
reduce to 600 units by the end of 1985 and 300 units toward the 
close of 1990. 
(3) Each side should determine which weapons to reduce, and to 
carry out replacements and modernization of armaments "whose frame- 
work is to be determined additionally." 
( 4 )  The main means of reduction would be destruction, but this 
would not exclude the possibility of withdrawing a part of armaments 
behind some agreed lines. 
( 5 )  There should be adequate control of compliance. 
(6) During negotiations each side will abstain from additional 
deployments and the medium-range arms of both sides deployed in the 
region are to be frozen quantitatively and qualitatively. If the 
U.S. agreed to the moratorium on deployment of medium-range arms for 
the period of negotiations the Soviet side would be prepared as a 
gesture of good will to reduce its medium-range arms in the European 
area of the 1J.S.S.R. on a unilateral basis. 
The U.S. response to the Soviet pro~osal to reduce to 300 missiles by 1990 was 
that, if it were linked with the Soviet moratorium, it could exclude virtually all 
U.S. missiles and other intermediate-range vehicles from Europe while leaving 300 
Soviet SS-20s intact. The British and French IMF weapons, which would have to be 
counted on the NATO side, would make up most of the 300 weapons allotted to NATO. 
Thus the Soviet plan, according to the U.S. interpretation, would establish and 
perpetuate an overwhelming Soviet advantage. 
This construction by the U.S. of the effect of the Soviet proposal does not 
exclude the possibility that, if the latter were subject to certain conditions and 
amendments, it could offer an o~portunity for a U.S. counterproposal. Its prin- 
ciple of a staged reduction of weapons to a terminal equal level is one that 
appears to coincide wth the U . S .  objective of reductions to an equal and equitable 
level. 
Five weeks later the Soviet Union introduced another proposal into the 
discussion. On the same day that the INF negotiations recessed for two 
months-+larch 16--Soviet P r e s i d e n t  Brezhnev, i n  a  major f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a d d r e s s ,  
announced a  number of  impor tan t  new i n i t i a t i v e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
These were e v i d e n t l y  new p o s i t i o n s  which had n o t  been p r o f f e r e d  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a -  
t ions  themselves .  -. 
The s i g n i f i c a n t  p o i n t s  i n  t e m s  of  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on IMF were a s  f o l l o w s :  
I 
( 1 )  The S o v i e t  Union would u n i l a t e r a l l y  c e a s e  d e p l o y i c g  a n y  
a d d i t i o n a l  medium-range armaments i n  t h e  E u r o ~ e a n  a r e a  of  t h e  
U.S.S.R. ( I t  became apparen t .  from l a t e r  S o v i e t  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  
moratorium a p p l i e d  j u s t  t o  SS-20s, n o t  t o  a l l  medium-range arma- 
ments.  The geograph ic  a r e a  i s > g e n e r a l l y  cons ide red  t o  be t h a L  t o  
t h e  west of  t h e  Ural Mountains.  .It e v i d e n t l y  d i d  no t  apply  t o  a  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  deployments t o  t h e  e a s t  a€ t h o s e  mounta ins . ) ,  
Brezhnev added t h a t  t h e  moratorium would app ly  .to b o t h  t h e  quan- 
t i t a t i v e  and q u a l i t a t i v e , a s p e c t s  of  t h e s e  armaments. 
( 2 )  He announced t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  y e a r  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union would u n i l a t e r a l l y  reduce a  number of  medium-range m i s s i l e s .  
Pres.umably t h e s e  w i l l  b e  o l d e r  SS-4s and SS-5s. 
' I 
What Brezhnev meant by 
. . 
of deployment s i t e s  a r e  now 
( 3 )  P r e s i d e n t  Brezhnev s a i d  t h e  S o v i e t  moratorium would be  i n  
e f f e c t  u n t i l  a n  agreement was reached wi th  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  "on 
t h e  b a s i s  of  p a r i t y  and equa l  s e c u r i t y "  t o  reduce medium-range 
n u c l e a r  weapons "des igned f o r  use i n  Europe", o r  u n t i l  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  made " p r a c t i c a l  p r e p a r a t i o n s  t o  deploy" P e r s h i n g  2 and ground- 
launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  i n  Europe.  
I I  p r a c t i c a l  p r e p a r a t i o n s " ,  i s  n o t  c l e a r .  P r e p a r a t i o n  
underway i n  B r i t a i n  and I t a l y  b u t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union h a s  
moratorium. n o t  announced a n  end t o  t h e  
A White House p r e s s  r e  
t a r y ,  d a t e d  March 16,  1982,  
l e a s e ,  S ta tement  by t h e  P r i n c i p a l  Deputy P r e s s  Secre -  
condemned t h e  Brezhnev " u n i l a t e r a l  moratorium" a s  
11 n e i t h e r  u n i l a t e r a l  nor  a moratorium." It charged t h a t  t h e  p roposa l  sought  t o  
m a i n t a i n  S o v i e t  weapon s u p e r i o r i t y ,  d i v i d e  t h e  West and s e c u r e  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  
. . 
Union "unchal lenged hegemony1' o v e r  Europe,  The Wnite House paper  denied t h a t  t h e  
Brezhnev p roposa l  was " u n i l a t e r a l "  because  i t  was l i n k e d  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  
X;TOts December 1979 deployment d e c i s i o n  n o t  be  implemented. 
f 
The White House s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  now had t h r e e  hundred SS-20 m i s s i l e s  
deployed w i t h  n i n e  hundred warheads. Moreover, i t  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
had p repared  new s i t e s  f o r  SS-20s t o  t h e  west  a s  w e l l  a s  e a s t  of t h e  U r a l s ,  t h u s  
demons t ra t ing  t h a t  they  d i d  n o t  r e a l l y  i n t e n d  t o  s t o p  t h e i r  SS-20 b u i l d u p .  The 
S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  was n o t  r e a l l y  a  moratorium, a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  White House, because  
it was l i m i t e d  on ly  t o  Europe and d i d  n o t  i n c l u d e  t h e  Asian S o v i e t  Union where 
SS-20s cou ld  be  f r e e l y  deployed and s t i l l  s t r i k e  Western Europe.  
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  Government condemned t h e  S o v i e t  i n i t i a t i v e  a s  
propaganda and a  r e f u s a l  t o  n e g o t i a t e  s e r i o u s l y ,  and r e j e c t e d  i t .  The U.S. a f -  
f i rmed i t s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  implement b o t h  t r a c k s  of t h e  December 1979 
d e c i s i o n .  A number o f  o b s e r v e r s  d i s c o u n t e d  t h e  Brezhnev moratorium because  t h e y  
b e l i e v e d  t h e  S o v i e t  Union had planned about  300 SS-20s from t h e  beg inn ing .  The 
White House d i s c l o s u r e  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  s i t e s  f o r  SS-20s were p repared  seemed t o  
b e l i e  t h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w h i l e  t h e  U.S.S.R. might have t h e  c a p a b i l -  
i t y  t o  deploy more, t h e r e  was a  p r a c t i c a l  s a t u r a t i o n  p o i n t  i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  manpower 
and o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s .  
The Brezhnev proposa l  mentioned t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of an  agreement w i t h  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  f o r  a  r e d u c t i o n  of medium-range n u c l e a r  weapons "on t h e  b a s i s  o f  p a r i t y  and 
e q u a l  s e c u r i t y "  and s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e c a l l e d  t h e  e a r l i e r  p r o p o s a l s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
a s  d e s c r i b e d  above. It l e f t  a  c l e a r  opening f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  
U;S. and o t h e r  NATO spokesmen on sundry o c c a s i o n s  a f t e r  t h e  announcement o f  
t h e  u n i l a t e r a l  moratorium by Brezhnev d e c l a r e d  t h a t  they saw no ev idence  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  Union had a c t u a l l y  s topped dep loy ing  SS-20s and t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  launch s i t e s  
f o r  t h o s e  m i s s i l e s  were s t i l l  under c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
P r e s i d e n t  Rrezhnev t o l d  t h e  S o v i e t  Komsomol i n  Moscow on May 18 t h a t  t h e  
U.S.S.R. was a l r e a d y  reduc ing  t h e  number o f  medium-range m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  European 
p a r t  o f  t h e  U.S.S.R. and he  promised t h a t  no a d d i t i o n a l  medium-range m i s s i l e s  
would be deployed e a s t  of t h e  U r a l s  ( o u t s i d e  Europe) o r  i n  any l o c a t i o n  where t h e y  
cou ld  r e a c h  Western Europe. The promise e v i d e n t l y  d i d  n o t  a p p l y  t o  m i s s i l e s  which 
could  s t r i k e  o t h e r  a r e a s .  
He a l s o  responded t o  t h e  U.8, p r o p o s a l  t h a t  a l l  m i s s i l e s  deployed i n  t h e  
e a s t e r n  p a r t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union should  be inc luded  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  He c a l l e d  
i t  "absurd , "  and a s s e r t e d  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on l i m i t i n g  m i s s i l e s  should  b e  con- 
duc ted  on ly  w i t h  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  had m i s s i l e s  opposing t h e  S o v i e t  m i s s i l e s .  
I n  o t h e r  words,  h e  e v i d e n t l y  meant i t  would b e  p r o p e r  t o  n e g o t i a t e  o n l y  wi th  China 
r e g a r d i n g  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  e a s t e r n  U.S.S.R. 61  It was a  s e p a r a t e  q u e s t i o n ,  i n  - 
Brezhnev ' s  expressed  judgment, whether any such n e g o t i a t i o n s  would b e  conducted.  
Subsequen t ly ,  Fore ign  M i n i s t e r  Andrei  Gromyko t o l d  t h e  United Na t ions  General  
Assembly S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n  on Disarmament i n  June  7 1  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  TJnion i s  "pre- - 
pared t o  a g r e e  on a  t o t a l  r e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  a l l  t y p e s  o f  medium-range n u c l e a r  
weapons t a r g e t e d  i n  Europe.  " The key phrase  i s  "a1 1 typest '--presumably i n c l u d i n g  
a l l  a i r c r a f t  and SLBMs, i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  of  t h e  U.S. and o t h e r  NATO c o u n t r i e s .  
He r e p e a t e d  what appeared t o  be a  more g e n e r a l i z e d  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  TASS 
r e l e a s e  i n  February ,  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union was p repared  " t o  reduce  
g r a d u a l l y ,  b u t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  by t h e  hundred medium-range n u c l e a r  weapons on b o t h  
s i d e s .  ..." But h i s  s t a t e m e n t  showed no s i g n  of  S o v i e t  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  
t h e  U.S. p r o p o s a l  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  r e d u c t i o n s  s o l e l y  on m i s s i l e s .  
I n  summary, bo th  s i d e s  have opened t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  by making v i g o r o u s  p o l i t -  
i c a l ,  p u b l i c  p r o p o s a l s .  There i s  v i r t u a l l y  no chance t h a t  e i t h e r  s i d e ' s  i n i t i a l  
6 /  T h i s  assumes t h a t  no o t h e r  c o u n t r y  a d j a c e n t  t o  t h e  e a s t e r n  U.S.S.R. h a s  
mediuG-range m i s s i l e s  a t  p r e s e n t .  See s e c t i o n  below, "China and t h e  Zero Option." 
7 /  New York Times, June 16,  1982, p. A 2 0 .  - 
p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be accepted by the o the r .  Nei ther  s i d e  can a f fo rd  t o  cont inue  on 
cont inue on an i n f l e x i b l e  course because,  i f  t h e  U.S. does, i t  r i s k s  l o s i n g  t h e  
support of i t s  European a l l i e s  f o r  deployment of t he  U.S. INF m i s s i l e s ,  and i f  the  
Sovie t  Union does,  i t  w i l l  run the danger of  convincing t h e  NATO Europeans t h a t  
t he re  i s  no a l t e r n a t i v e  but  t o  proceed wi th  the  deployment of the  m i s s i l e s  a s  
o r i g i n a l l y  agreed. It  would appear t o  be i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of both s i d e s  t o  a r r i v e  
a t  some compromise s o l u t i o n  which w i l l  p e r n i t  some lower l e v e l ,  l e s s  t h rea t en ing  
deployment of INF weaponry on both s i d e s .  
V .  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  U.S. and S o v i e t  M i s s i l e s  
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  m i s s i l e s  which the  U.S. contends  should  be  t h e  
p r i o r i t y  s u b j e c t s  of  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  have i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  which 
each  s i d e  h a s  made. 
A .  U.S. M i s s i l e s  
The P e r s h i n g  2 i s  a mobi le  land-based b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  t h a t  i s  scheduled t o  
r e p l a c e  t h e  108 P e r s h i n g  1As now under U.S. command i n  Western Germany. An add i -  
t i o n a l  7 2  P e r s h i n g  1As under West German command a r e  n o t  a f f e c t e d  by t h i s  pro- 
gram. 8 1  The P e r s h i n g  2 w i l l  have a  n u c l e a r  warhead w i t h  s e l e c t a b l e  y i e l d s  de- - 
s i g n e d  f o r  a  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  u s e s  employing bo th  a i r  and s u r f a c e  b u r s t s .  I t s  
maximum y i e l d  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  be up t o  200 k i l o t o n s .  Because of i t s  h i g h e r  
accuracy ,  w i t h  r a d a r  t e r m i n a l  guidance,  i t  h a s  lower y i e l d s  than  t h e  P e r s h i n g  1 A  
f o r  v a r i o u s  m i s s i o n s ,  t h u s  reduc ing  c o l l a t e r a l  damage. I t s  range i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  
be  about  1000 m i l e s  compared t o  400 m i l e s  f o r  t h e  P e r s h i n g  1A.  
The deployment of  t h e  f i r s t  o f  108 m i s s i l e s  i s  scheduled f o r  December 1983 
( p o s s i b l y  s l i p p i n g  t o  e a r l y  1984) and deployment complet ion i s  scheduled f o r  
December 1985. Development and t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  P e r s h i n g  2 have been de layed  and 
t h e r e  i s  some u n c e r t a i n t y  whether i t  can be  deployed by t h e  end o f  1983 o r  e a r l y  
1984. I n  an  e f f o r t  t o  meet t h e  scheduled deployment d a t e  t h e  Pentagon h a s  o r d e r e d  
p r o d u c t i o n  t o  s t a r t  b e f o r e  t e s t i n g  i s  complete .  
The ground-launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e  (GLCM) i s  a n  a i r - b r e a t h i n g  m i s s i l e  de- 
s igned  t o  be launched from mobi le ,  ground-based b u t  a i r - t r a n s p o r t a b l e  p l a t f o r m s .  
I t s  r ange  i s  expec ted  t o  be  about  1500 m i l e s  and i t  w i l l  f l y  low w i t h  t e r r a i n -  
matching guidance and have r e l a t i v e l y  good t e r m i n a l  accuracy  w i t h i n  s e v e r a l  hundred 
81  See  p. 19 below. - 
A s  a  r e s u l t  they possess  only a  minor c a p a b i l i t y  of n e u t r a l i z i n g  o r  damaging Sov ie t  
f e e t  of t h e  t a r g e t .  It w i l l  have a  s e l e c t a b l e  y i e l d  warhead with a  maximum y i e l d  
i n  t h e  100-200 k i l o t o n  range. I t s  low f l i g h t  prof i le--under  s e v e r a l  hundred 
feet--plus  i t s  subsonic  speed of t h e  o r d e r  o f  600 mi l e s  per hour ,  a long  an  i r r e g -  
u l a r  f l i g h t  path i s  expected t o  g ive  i t  good p e n e t r a t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  a g a i n s t  enemy 
a i r  de fenses  . 
Although the re  have been r e p o r t s  of s l i ppage  i n  t h e  GLCM program i t  i s  
scheduled f o r  i n i t i a l  deployment i n  December 1983. 1J.S. A i r  Force Commander Lew 
Al len  dec l a r ed  r e c e n t l y  t h a t  GLCMs w i l l  be  deployed on schedule .  - 9/ 
The Persh ing  2s and GLCMs w i l l  d e r i v e  pre-launch s u r v i v a b i l i t y  from t h e i r  
mob i l i t y .  Normally they w i l l  be  concent ra ted  a t  c e r t a i n  depots ,  and upon warning 
they w i l l  move t o  t h e i r  d i spersed  f i r i n g  s i t e s .  
The Pershing 2s  and t h e  GLCMs w i l l  be under exc lus ive  l ln i ted  S t a t e s  command 
and c o n t r o l .  However, t he  d e c i s i o n  by the  U.S. P re s iden t  t o  r e l e a s e  them dur ing  
a  time of c o n f l i c t  i s  sub j ec t  t o  agreements and procedures w i th in  NATO a f f e c t i n g  
a l l  nuc lear  weapons of t he  a l l i a n c e .  These procedures  a r e  hidden i n  o f f i c i a l  
secrecy  and cannot be d i scussed  he re .  S u f f i c e  i t  t o  say  t h a t  some governments 
w i t h i n  t he  a l l i a n c e  have manifested a  d e s i r e  t h a t  the  U.S. have f u l l  r e s p o n s i b l i t y  
f o r  t h e  INF weapons. However, t h e  I t a l i a n  Government h a s  p u b l i c l y  s t r e s s e d  t h e  
NATO c o n s u l t a t i v e  process  t h a t  w i l l  g ive Rome a vo i ce  i n  any d e c i s i o n  t o  f i r e  
t h e  weapons based on I t a l i a n  s o i l .  
The ques t i on  of  c o n t r o l  o f  the  Persh ing  1 A s  now under t h e  command of t h e  West 
German m i l i t a r y  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  The warheads f o r  t he se  m i s s i l e s  a r e  under t h e  con- 
c o n t r o l  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  and the  m i s s i l e s  themselves a r e  under t he  c o n t r o l  of  
t he  West German government. Consesequentlv,  both must a s s e n t  t o  f i r e  a  weapon. 
91 S t a r s  and S t r i p e s ,  A p r i l  5 ,  1982. 
The U.S. and West German governments a r e  n e g o t i a t i n g  t o  de te rmine  whether t h e  
72 West German c o n t r o l l e d  P e r s h i n g  1As w i l l  be r e p l a c e d  by new P e r s h i n g  lBs ,  which 
a r e  a  modi f i ed  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  P e r s h i n g  2  w i t h  a  reduced range  t h a t  w i l l  n o t  pe rmi t  
them t o  s t r i k e  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y  from West German s i t e s .  Presumably,  t h e i r  r ange  
would pe rmi t  them t o  s t r i k e  S o v i e t  and o t h e r  Warsaw pac t  m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s  i n  E a s t  
Germany, Poland and p o s s i b l y  o t h e r  E a s t e r n  European a r e a s ,  b u t  n o t  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union. 
Many o b s e r v e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  U.S. p l a n  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  p lanned deployment 
of P e r s h i n g  2  and GLCM u n i t s  a s  a  b a r g a i n i n g  element i n  t h e  "ze ro  op t ion"  p r o p o s a l  
l a c k s  s t r m g t h  because  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  on ly  a  promise ,  t h r e a t e n e d  by l a c k  o f  p u b l i c  
suppor t  i n  NATO Europe,  v e r s u s  a c t u a l l y  deployed S o v i e t  weapons. Although t h e  
P e r s h i n g  2 s  and GLCMs a r e  n o t  a c t u a l l y  deployed,  t h e y  a r e  on t h e  way and t h e y  
r e p r e s e n t  a  t h r e a t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  c o n s i d e r  ex t remely  g rave .  The P e r s h i n g  2s  
have a  range t h a t  could  reach  almost  t o  Moscow and t h e  GLCMs have an even l o n g e r  
r ange .  The P e r s h i n g s  have a  t r a v e l  t ime of roughly  e i g h t  minutes  o r  l e s s  and a r e  
looked upon by t h e  S o v i e t s  a s  s u r p r i s e  f i r s t - s t r i k e  weapons t h a t  could  be  aimed 
a t  v i t a l  t a r g e t s ,  such a s  command c e n t e r s  and key c o m u n i c a t i o n  h e a d q u a r t e r s  on 
S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y .  The P e r s h i n g  2  would be  v i r t u a l l y  imposs ib le  t o  s t o p .  S o v i e t  
o b s e r v e r s  s a y  they  a r e  capab le  of b e i n g  employed i n  an  i n i t i a l  preempt ive  a t t a c k  
t h a t  would knock o u t  e s s e n t i a l  means of  r e t a l i a t i o n  a s  a  p r e c u r s o r  t o  a  more gen- 
e r a l  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  on S o v i e t  s o i l ,  
The deployment of  o n l y  108 Persh ing  2  m i s s i l e s  i n  Germany, even though they  
can s t r i k e  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y - - i n c l u d i n g  some major c i t i e s - - i n  on ly  f i v e  t o  e i g h t  
m i n u t e s ,  does n o t  by i t s e l f ,  c o n s t i t u t e  a  f i r s t - s t r i k e  c a p a b i l i t y .  One hundred 
such m i s s i l e s  cannot  come anywhere c l o s e  t o  d e s t r o y i n g  enough S o v i e t  o f f e n s i v e  
f a c i l i t i e s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  f i r s t - s t r i k e  c a p a b i l i t y .  The number i s  t o o  l i m i t e d  and 
t h e i r  r ange  i s  such t h a t  l a r g e  expanses  of  t h e  S o v i e t  Union could  n o t  be s t r u c k .  
ICBM s i l o s ,  most of  which a r e  o u t  of r ange .  They p o s s i b l y  could  n e u t r a l i z e  some 
SS-4,  SS-5 and SS-20 l aunch ing  s i t e s ,  h u t  o n l y  a  f r a c t i o n .  Although t h e  P e r s h i n g  
2 s  a r e  fearsome a n t i - c i t y  weapons and can be e f f e c t i v e  a q a i n s t  o t h e r ,  s o f t e r  m i l i -  
t a r y  t a r g e t s ,  t h e  group planned f o r  deployment i s  p r i m a r i l y  a  r e s p o n s i v e  r a t h e r  
t h a n  a  f i r s t - s t r i k e  f o r c e .  
The ground-launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  do no t  appear  t o  b o t h e r  t h e  S o v i e t s  a s  
much a s  t h e  P e r s h i n g  2 .  The p e n e t r a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  GLCYs i s  mentioned 
above. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  f l y  a t  t h e  speed  of  s u b s o n i c  a i r -  
c r a f t  and t h e  S o v i e t  Union ' s  e x t e n s i v e  a i r  d e f e n s e s ,  inc l l td ing  thousands  of i n t e r -  
c e p t o r  a i r c r a f t  and s u r f a c e - t o - a i r  m i s s i l e s ,  cou ld  o f f e r  fo rmidab le  o p p o s i t i o n .  
The r e l a t i v e l y  long f l i g h t  t imes  of c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  a l s o  a f f o r d  a  chance f o r  
S o v i e t  warning systems t o  a l e r t  d e f e n s e s .  
One reason  NATO h a s  k e p t  l i m i t e d  t h e  number of  P e r s h i n g  2 s  and GLCMs planned 
f o r  deployment i s  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  wish t o  become over -p rovoca t ive  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union. It i s  e v i d e n t ,  however, t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t l y  p lanned t o t a l  of 5 7 2  u n i t s  i s  
no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  an  i n d e f i n i t e  c e i l i n g  and t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t s  mich t  he  p lanned 
l a t e r ,  Moreover, t e c h n o l o g i c a l  improvements, such a s  p e n e t r a t i o n  a i d s  and m u l t i p l e  
warheads ,  could  he  added l a t e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of G1,CM. 
Some Execu t ive  branch o f f i c i a l s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  t o  f a v o r  dep loy ing  more t h a n  108 
P e r s h i n g  2s  i f  t h e r e  i s  no agreement o? l i m i t i n g  IUF armaments. The Amy h a s  
o r d e r e d  more t h a n  108 of  t h e  m i s s i l e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  have a  s u f f i c i e n t  number f o r  
development and testing pclrp?s?s a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  deployment.  There  a r e  a l s o  
budge ta ry  p l a n s  f o r  o r d e r i n g  more c o n i e s  of  t h e  m i s s i l e  i n  f u t u r e  y e a r s .  Onc o f  
t h e  r e a s o n s  advaqced hv t h e  Pentagon a s  i u s r  i f  i c q t  r n n  f a r  o r c i e r i q g  a d r ' , i t i o n l '  
c o p i e s  i s  t h a t  i t  would h e l p  t o  reduce t'lp u n i p  c u c f  of t h p  m i s s i l e ,  which l i k e  
many m i l i t a r y  hardware v r o g r m s  i s  e s c a l a t i n = .  X ' IV>Y-  a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t s  o f  P e r s h i n g  
2s might be  deployed o t h e r  t h a n  i n  NATO Europe i s  no t  c l e a r  a t  t h e  moment, How- 
e v e r ,  i t  i s  conce ivab le  t h a t  t h e y  might be dep loyed ,  f o r  example,  i n  E a s t e r n  A s i a  
f o r  t a r g e t i n g  on t h e  S o v i e t  Union. There would seem t o  be no o t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  
t a r g e t s  f o r  weapons of t h i s  t y p e ,  from t h e  U.S. p e r s p e c t i v e  a t  t h i s  t i m e ,  e x c e p t  
on t h e  t e r r i t o r y  of  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. 
B .  S o v i e t  M i s s i l e s  
The S o v i e t  Union s t a r t e d  dep loy ing  SS-4s and SS-5s i n  t h e  l a t e  1950s. They 
were f ixetl  s i l o  based m i s s i l e s  w i t h  s i n g l e , ' o n e  megaton warheads.  A maximum of 
about 700 were deployed a t  one t ime  b u t  t h i s  f i g u r e  h a s  g r a d u a l l y  been reduced i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s  a s  t h e  SS-20 came on l i n e .  The SS-4 h a s  a  range of  about 1000 m i l e s ,  
t h e  SS-5 about 2200 m i l e s .  There a r e  p o s s i b l y  300 SS-4s now deployed and 50 SS-5s. 
They a r e  o l d ,  of  out-dated d e s i g n  and probably  d e t e r i o r a t i n g .  T h e i r  accuracy  of 
a  m i l e  o r  more i s  compara t ive ly  poor. 
The S o v i e t  Union began t o  r e p l a c e  them with  SS-20s beg inn ing  i n  1977, a l though  
on a  somewhat l e s s  t h a n  one f o r  one b a s i s .  The SS-20 i s  mobi le  and h a s  a  r e l o a d  
c a p a b i l i t y .  The former  enhances i t s  i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y  and t h e  l a t t e r  i t s  w a r f i g h t -  
i n g  c a p a b i l i t y .  
The deployed model of t h e  SS-20 h a s  t h r e e  independen t ly  t a r g e t a b l e  warheads 
o f  150 k i l o t o n s  each wi th  a  range of 3000 m i l e s .  There a r e  some r e p o r t s  of  o t h e r  
models wi th  d i f f e r e n t  numbers of  warheads and a  longer  r ange .  F i g u r e s  used by 
U.S. o f f i c i a l s  almost  i n v a r i a b l y  assume t h a t  a l l  deployed have t h r e e  warheads.  
The i n t e l l i g e n c e  community e s t i m a t e s  of r ange  d i f f e r  from t h e  S t a t e  Department 
e s t i m a t e s  of 2600 t o  3100 m i l e s .  I t s  accuracy  i s  r e p o r t e d  by one NATO group a s  
440 f e e t  o v e r  a  2500 m i l e  range.  - 101 Other  r e p o r t s  say  1000 t o  1200 f e e t .  
101 U.S. S e n a t e  Committee on F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ,  I n t e r i m  Report  on Nuclear  
weap=s i n  Europe,  Prepared by t h e  North A t l a n t i c  Assembly's S p e c i a l  Committee 
on Nuclear  Weapons i n  Europe,  1981, p. 9 (Committee P r i n t ) .  
When t h e  S o v i e t  Union r e c e n t l y  announced a  moratorium on deployment o f  t h e  
SS-20s, t h e r e  were about  300 i n  t h e  f i e l d .  The S t a t e  Department a s s e r t e d ,  how- 
e v e r ,  t h a t  f i v e  a d d i t i o n a l  s i t e s  appeared t o  be  under c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  t h e  U.S.S.R. 
That  was a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t s  might be deployed i f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
of t h e  moratorium were no t  met. S i n c e  t h e n ,  a s  r e p o r t e d  above,  Rtezhnev h a s  de- 
c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  moratorium i s  be ing  implemented and t h a t  u n i l a t e r a l  d ismant lement  
o f  o t h e r  m i s s i l e s  i s  underway. A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e  Richard Bur t  charged 
on J u n e  30 i n  B r u s s e l s  t h a t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  on SS-20 s i t e s  which had been begun by 
t h e  t ime  of  t h e  Brezhnev announcement of a  moratorium i n  March was c o n t i n u i n g ,  
t h a t  two of t h e s e  s i t e s  i n  t h e  Western U.S.S.R. had been completed,  and t h a t  con- 
s t r u c t i o n  on t h e  o t h e r  s i t e s  was s t i l l  underway. No new s i t e s  had been s t a r t e d  
s i n c e  t h e  announcement, but  Burt  charged t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  s t a t e m e n t s  had been " m i s -  
leading" .  Burt  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union now had about  315 SS-20 l a u n c h e r s  w i t h  
945 warheads. TASS responded, "Mr. Burt  knows h e  i s  l y i n g . .  . . I t  111 -
A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  Russ ian  SS-20 m i s s i l e  i s  t h a t  i t s  l o n g e r  range ,  
q r e a t e r  accuracy ,  t h r e e  warheads and reduced y i e l d  make it a  more v e r s a t i l e  a t t a c k  
weapon t h a n  t h e  o l d e r ,  l a r g e r  y i e l d ,  l e s s  a c c u r a t e  and shor te r - ranged  SS-4s and 
SS-5s. Thus t h e  S o v i e t s  might be more i n c l i n e d  t o  use  it because  it cou ld  be  
e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s  w h i l e  reduc ing  c o l l a t e r a l  economic o r  human 
damage. 
.---.- --- 
111 Washington Times, J u l y  1, 1982, and New York Times,  J u l y  2, 1982. -
V I .  The B a t t l e  o f  t h e  Numbers 
A. C o n f l i c t s  i n  S t a t i s t i c s  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  i s  a  p u b l i c  b a t t l e  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  
ove r  t h e  numbers and k i n d s  of weapons f a l l i n g  i n t o  an in te rmedia te - range  c a t e g o r y  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y  n u c l e a r  ba l ance  i n  Europe. 
I n  coun t ing  up t h e  u n i t s  on each  s i d e  t h e  Sov ie t  Union c l a ims  t h a t  t h e  numbers 
have  remained about  t h e  same f o r  yea r s - -nea r ly  1000 u n i t s  on each s i d e ,  986 f o r  
NATO and 975 f o r  t h e  Sov ie t  Union. 121 On t h i s  b a s i s  Moscow c l a ims  t h a t  a  n u c l e a r  -
b a l a n c e  h a s  e x i s t e d  and s t i l l  e x i s t s  i n  Europe. 
The Sov ie t  Union h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  contended t h a t  a l l  medium-range - 131 armaments 
" in tended  f o r  use  i n  Europe1' should  b e  inc luded  i n  reckoning  t h e  ba l ance  and should  
be t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The Sov ie t  Government i n c l u d e s  i n  t h i s  
count  on t h e  Western s i d e ,  Pe r sh ing  1 m i s s i l e s ,  f i g h t e r  bombers of  v a r i o u s  t ypes  
(F-111s and F B - l l l s ,  F-4s, A-6s and A-7s), and B r i t i s h  and French m i s s i l e s  and 
bombers. On t h e  Sov ie t  s i d e  it counts  i t s  SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s, p l u s  c e r t a i n  
submarine m i s s i l e s  and medium-range bombers ( B a c k f i r e s ,  B l i n d e r s  and Badgers ) .  
121 U.S.S.R. M i n i s t r y  o f  Defense,  Whence The Threa t  t o  Peace ,  p. 65. C i t e d  
h e r e a E e r  a s  "Whence ." 
131 The S o v i e t s  u se  t h i s  t e rm  r a t h e r  t h a n  " in te rmedia teq1- range .  The Sov ie t  
~ n i o n T e f i n e s  medium-range weapons a s  t h o s e  w i th  a  range ( o r  a c t i o n  r a d i u s )  of 
1000 k i l o m e t e r s  (600 m i l e s )  o r  more, exc lud ing  i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  s t r a t e g i c  weapons, 
which a r e  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  SALT 11 T r e a t y  a s  t h o s e  w i th  a  range of 5500 k i l o m e t e r s  
(3350 m i l e s ) .  
The Sov ie t  count  of bo th  s i d e s  i s  a s  fo l l ows :  - 141 
U.S. - 
.................... Per sh ing  1 m i s s i l e s  108 
(Range: 400 naut  . a i l e s )  
Fighter-bombers  ......................... 555 
(F-1119, F-4s, A-6s, A-7s, FB-111s) 
BRITISH 
P o l a r i s  m i s s i l e s  ...................... 64 ........................ Vulcan bombers 58 
FRENCH 
Land-based m i s s i l e s  ................... 18  
Submarine m i s s i l e s  .................... 80 
Mirage-4 bombers ...................... 33 
WEST GERMAN 
Pe r sh ing  1 m i s s i l e s  ................... 72 
SOVIET 
............ Land-based m i s s i l e s  496 
(SS-~OS,  SS-5s, SS-4s) 
............. Submarine m i s s i l e s  1 8  
(SS-N-5 s )  
........... Medium-range bombers 461 
( B a c k f i r e ,  Badgers ,  ~ l i n d e r s )  -- 
975 
14 /  New York Times, November 30,  1981. It c i t e s  a s  s o u r c e s ,  P r e s i d e n t  Rrezhnev and a  
p a p e r T y  L i e u t .  Gen. N i k o l a i  Chervov of  t h e  Sov ie t  Union. The l a t t e r  i s  an  o f f i c e r  on t h e  
Sov ie t  Genera l  S t a f f .  
The S w i e t  Union contends t h a t  t h e  SS-20s have not changed the  e x i s t i n g  bal- 
ance i n  Europe because when they have been deployed "old models" ( ev iden t ly  SS-4s 
and SS-5s) have been scrapped. They exp la in  t h a t  while t he  SS-20 c a r r i e s  t h ree  
warheads, t h e i r  t o t a l  explosive y i e l d  i s  l e s s  than t h a t  of t he  dismantled mis- 
s i l e s .  The whole process  has  reduced t h e  t o t a l  number of mi s s i l e s  a s  we l l  as  t h e  
aggregate  y i e l d  of warheads, they a s s e r t .  151 However, t he  t o t a l  number of war- - 
heads has been increased .  
I n  h i s  speech of November 18, 1981, i n  which he proposed the  "zero opt ion ,"  
Pres ident  Reagan denied the  Russian claim t h a t  a balance of medium-range systems 
ex i s t ed  i n  Europe. H e  a s se r t ed  t h a t  t he  Soviet  Union had a s i x  t o  one advantage 
i n  such systems. The S t a t e  Department re leased  the  following f igu res  t o  sub- 
s t a n t i a t e  t h i s  r a t i o :  161 -
Miss i l e s  ............................. O 
F-111 fighter-bombers ................ 164 
F-4s .................................. 265 
A-6s and A-7s ........................ 68 
FB-111s .............................. 63 
( I n  U.S. f o r  use i n  Europe) 
SOVIET 
SS-20s .................... 250 ........... SS-4s and SS-5s 350 
SS-12s and SS-22s ......... 100 
SS-N-5s ................... 30 
TU-26 Backfire  bombers .... 4 5 
TTJ-16 Badgers and ......... TU-22 Bl inders  350 
SU-17, SU-24 and MIG-27 
fighter-bombers ........ 2,700 
3,825 
------- 
151 Whence, p. 65. -
161 Department of S t a t e  ~ u l l e t i n ,  January 1982, p. 71, -
B.  Appraising t h e  Balance 
According t o  t h e s e  S t a t e  Department f i g u r e s ,  t h e  U.S. had 560 a i r c r a f t  based 
i n  Europe o r  f o r  use i n  Europe, inc lud ing  FB-Il ls ,  F - l l l s ,  A-4s and A-7s and t h e  
Sov ie t  Union had 3825 m i s s i l e s  and a i r c r a f t  capable  of d e l i v e r i n g  nuc l ea r  weapons 
a t  intermediate-ranges,  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  mentioned by t h e  Sovie t  
Union, t h e  S t a t e  Department f i g u r e s  included 100 SS-12 and SS-22 b a l l i s t i c  m i s -  
s i l e s ,  t h e  f i r s t  with a  range of  approximately 500 mi l e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  l e s s  t han  t h e  
1000 k i lome te r s  considered by t h e  Sovie t  Union a s  t h e  cut-off  d i s t a n c e ,  and t h e  
second with a l a r g e r  range, p lus  2700 fighter-bombers (SU-17, SU-24 and MIG- 
27). - 171 
Obviously t h e r e  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  of viewpoint no t  on ly  i n  regard  
t o  t h e  types  of a i r c r a f t  and m i s s i l e s  t h a t  should be included i n  t h e  balance but 
a l s o  t h e i r  numbers. 
The S t a t e  Department a l l eged  t h a t  t h e  Sovie t  f i g u r e s  c la iming  n e a r l y  1000 
systems on each s i d e  concealed t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Sovie t  Union had a  monopoly of 
t h e  "most th rea ten ing"  systems, namely about 600 SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s with 1200 
warheads. NATO has  no comparable m i s s i l e s .  
The Sovie t s  claimed a  balance e x i s t e d  i n  1979, S t a t e  dec l a r ed ,  but s i n c e  then  
had added some 350 SS-20 warheads, so  how could t h e r e  be a  balance now? 
S t a t e  explained t h a t  t o  make i t s  t a b l e  i t  included Sovie t  systems comparable 
t o  t h e  U,S. systems i n  t h e  Soviet  count.  Thus i t  included 2700 nuclear-capable  
t a c t i c a l  a i r c r a f t  on t h e  Sovie t  s i d e  comparable t o  t h e  U.S. F-4. Moreover, t h e  
Sov ie t s  counted car r ie r -based  a i r c r a f t  on t h e  U.S. s i d e  bu t  included none of  t h e i r  
own. 
171 New York Times, November 30, 1981, p. A12. For  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
~ ~ - 1 2 T 2 2 ' s ,  s ee  below, "Short-Range Nuclear ~ i s s i l e s  i n  Europe." 
The coun t ing  game h a s  many problems. It demons t ra tes  t h e  c o m p l i c a t i o n s  of  
t r y i n g  t o  l i m i t  coun t s  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  geograph ic  a r e a  when weapon u n i t s  can 
r e a d i l y  be moved i n t o  o r  o u t  o f  t h a t  a r e a .  For  example, t h e  1J.S. c o u n t s  a l l  -
SS-20s i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  e a s t  of t h e  U r a l s ,  p a r t l y  on t h e  ground t h a t  t h e y  can  be 
moved from t h e r e  t o  European Russ ia .  The S o v i e t  Union exc ludes  some deployed i n  
t h e  Asian U.S.S.R. 
The reckoning o f  nuc lea r -capab le  f ighter-bombers  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  "nuclear-capable"  i n  n e a r l y  a l l  i n s t a n c e s  r e a l l y  means "dual  
capable1'--conventional  and nuclear--and such a i r c r a f t  may o r  may not  be employed 
i n  a  n u c l e a r  r o l e .  Moreover, no t  a l l  a i r c r a f t  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  type  have a  n u c l e a r  
c a p a b i l i t y .  Some might have and some might n o t .  The U . S .  e v i d e n t l y  c o ~ i n t s  - a l l  
S o v i e t  nuc lea r -capab le  f ighter-bombers ,  a t  l e a s t  of  some models, bu t  does not  
i n c l u d e  a l l  U.S. F-4s, F-16s, which a r e  nuc lea r -capab le ,  and o t h e r  t a c t i c a l  a i r -  -
c r a f t  l i k e  F-14s and F-15s which might he .  Nor does t h e  U.8. count - a l l  A-5s and 
A-7s on a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r s ,  a l l  of  which can  be  moved i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  w i t h i n  
s t r i k i n g  range  of  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. 
VII. I n c l u s i o n  of Systems i n  t h e  N e g o t i a t i o n s  
There  i s  a  major d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two s i d e s  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  which 
systems t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
A .  The U.S. P o s i t i o n  
The U.S. h a s  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  SS-4s, SS-58 
and SS-20s on t h e  S o v i e t  s i d e  and t o  P e r s h i n g  2s  and GLCMs on t h e  U.S. s i d e .  Other-  
w i s e ,  U.S. pol icymakers  con tend ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  cou ld  g e t  t o o  compl ica ted .  T h i s  
p o s i t i o n  aims mainly  a t  t h e  S o v i e t  weapons, t h e  SS-20s, which a r e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  s o u r c e  o f  danger  t o  t h e  U.S. and t h e  YATO a l l i e s .  The SS-4s and SS-5s, 
a l though  deployed f o r  two decades ,  were n o t  thought  t o  be  a s  t h r e a t e n i n g  i n  t h e  
p a s t  because  t h e y  were d e t e r r e d  by t h e  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  umbre l l a .  They do n o t  have 
t h e  r a n g e ,  accuracy  and reduced v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  SS-20s. Rut w i t h  t h e  advent  
of s t r a t e g i c  p a r i t y  between t h e  U.S. and t h e  U.S .S .R . ,  t h e y  t o o  have a c q u i r e d  a  
t h r e a t e n i n g  a u r a ,  a l though  n o t  a s  prominent a s  t h a t  o f  t h e  SS-20s. 
Moreover, t h e  U .  S. m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  r e s t r i c t  i o n  o f  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  m i s s i l e s  
a v o i d s  t h e  compl ica t ions  t h a t  could  a r i s e  o v e r  d i s p u t e s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
i n c l u s i o n  o f  a i r c r a f t  and i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French systems.  NATO h a s  
approved t h e  U.S. approach of g i v i n g  p r i o r i t y  t o  m i s s i l e s ,  l e a v i n g  a i r c r a f t  t o  be  
n e g o t i a t e d  a t  a  l a t e r  s t a g e ,  and of e x c l u d i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French systems.  
B .  The S o v i e t  P o s i t i o n  -
A 1 1  sys tems c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  i n  Europe shou ld  b e  i n c l u d e d ,  accord-  
i n g  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. Moscow m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  i t s  medium-range m i s s i l e s  a r e  a  
c o u n t e r  t o  NATO's forward-based a i r c r a f t  and t h a t  a n  agreement c o n f i n e d  o n l y  t o  
m i s s i l e s  would  u p s e t  t h e  ba lance .  N e g o t i a t i o n s ,  i t  s a y s ,  should  n o t  be  l i m i t e d  t o  
sys tems "randomly chosen."  The S o v i e t  Union concedes  t h a t  i t  might be s i m p l e r  t o  
'+--. x l y  wi th  m i s s i l e s  b u t  it i n s i s t s  i t  cannot  s a c r i f i c e  i t s  s e c u r i t y  f o r  t h e  
- ak -  of s i m p l i c i t y .  
G e n e r a l l y  speak ing ,  t h e  wider  t h e  sweep of t h e  n e t  t o  t a k e  i n  a d d i t i o n a l  c a t e -  
g o r i e s  of weapon systems on each s i d e ,  t h e  more compl icated t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  cou ld  
"zcone. Th i s  i s  s o  because t h e  v a r i o u s  weapons systems a r e  n o t  comple te ly  compar- 
q h l e ,  a l though  s i m i l a r  i n  many c a s e s ,  and t h e r e  i s  a  tendency f o r  each s i d e ,  a s  it 
r o n t e m p l a t e s  add ing  a d d i t i o n a l  sys tems t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t o  minimize i t s  own 
sys tems and maximize t h o s e  o f  i t s  opponent.  I n  some c a s e s ,  however, a  b r o a d e r  
r ange  of  coverage could  f a c i l i t a t e  agreement by o f f e r i n g  more o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
t r a d e - o f f s .  
D e f i n i t i o n s  have been adop ted  by b o t h  s i d e s  t o  govern what sys tems should  h e  
i n c l u d e d .  The S o v i e t  d e f i n i t i o n  h a s  e x p l i c i t l y  inc luded  systems w i t h  a  range ex- 
ceed ing  1000 k i l o m e t e r s  o r  about  600 m i l e s .  An apparen t  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  i s  i t s  
i n c l u s i o n  of P e r s h i n g  1 m i s s i l e s  w i t h  a  range of about 400 m i l e s .  Moscow may have 
inc luded  them a s  "s tand- ins"  f o r  t h e  P e r s h i n g  2 m i s s i l e s ,  which a r e  s l a t e d  t o  r e -  
p l a c e  them. A b a s i c  concern  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union i s  t h o s e  systems t h a t  can  s t r i k e  
i t s  t e r r i t o r y  from anywhere i n  t h e  European r e g i o n .  
The above t a b l e  of  in te rmedia te - range  weapons i s s u e d  by t h e  U . S .  i s  e x p l a i n e d  
l f f i c i a l l y  a s  based on t h e  S o v i e t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r ange .  However, t h e  U.S.  h a s  no t  
- - 
- 1 .  i c i a l l y  adopted a  s p e c i f i c  range a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  of i n c l u s i o n  of  systems i n  INF 
a m -  c o n t r o l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  It might have not done s o  because  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e s  t h a t  
1 id  be  i n c u r r e d  over  what systems meet t h e  range c r i t e r i o n ,  o r  even o v e r  how t h e  
i t e r i o n  i t s e l f  might be framed. I n  regard  t o  t h e  SS-20s a  c r i t e r i o n  impor tan t  t o  
t h e  U.S. i s  whether they  can h i t  t a r g e t s  i n  NATO Europe. 
C .  De f i c i enc i e s  i n  C r i t e r i a  
Both range and mob i l i t y ,  which have been among c r i t e r i a  f o r  i nc lus ion  of  
weapon systems i n  t h e  proposals  of both s i d e s ,  have c e r t a i n  shortcomings. The 
range of a  weapon system (provided one can even de f ine  "weapon system") has sho r t -  
comings a s  a  c r i t e r i o n ,  f o r  example, because from i t s  l o c a t i o n  a  weapon may not  be 
ab l e  t o  h i t  t h e  a r ea  of concern o r ,  i f  i t  can, it might have a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
mission which would occupy it  elsewhere. I n  o the r  words, range could be i r r e l e v a n t  
o r  even misleading because i t  could involve systems t h a t  should not be  involved. 
Mobil i ty  i t s e l f  i s  not a  r e l i a b l e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  i nc lus ion  of a  system because 
i t  could l ead  t o  an unmanageable comprehensiveness. Moreover, acceptance of  mobil- 
i t y  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  could be h igh ly  de t r imen ta l  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  For i n s t ance ,  
a l l  U.S. a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r s  a r e  mobile and could move t o  l o c a t i o n s  where they  could -
s t r i k e  t h e  a r ea  of concern. Yet only 2 o r  3 a r e  normally deployed ad jacent  t o  
Europe. 
Moreover, a l l  U.S. t a c t i c a l  a i r c r a f t  ( i nc lud ing  nuclear-capable a i r c r a f t )  a r e  
mobile,  even on an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  s c a l e .  Such U.S. a i r c r a f t ,  f o r  example, rou- 
t i n e l y  f l y ,  a s s i s t e d  by a e r i a l  r e f u e l i n g ,  from t h e  U.S. t o  Western Europe and 
sometimes t o  Western Asia and o the r  d i s t a n t  spo t s .  They a r e  capable of s t r i k i n g  
S w i e t  t a r g e t s  from bases i n  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  U.S. i n  a  mat te r  of hours .  
The Soviet  Union has attempted t o  dea l  with t h e  mob i l i t y  problem i n  regard  t o  
t h e  SS-20s by inc luding  only those whose normal peacetime deployment s i t e s  enab le  
them t o  s t r i k e  t a r g e t s  i n  t he  adve r sa ry ' s  European (de f ined )  a rea .  P re s iden t  
Brezhnev expressed adherence t o  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i n  regard t o  removing weapon systems 
from the  European U.S.S.R. He has  s a i d  t h a t  they  would not  be r e loca t ed  t o  any 
s i t e  from which they could s t r i k e  Western Europe. 181 -
18/  See above, p. 15 .  -
The d i f f i c u l t  i e s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  c r i t e r i a  f o r  i n c l u d i n g  weapons i n  negot i a -  
t i o n s  c e n t e r e d  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  geograph ic  a r e a  o r  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a t e g o r y  of  
sys tems r e s t  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s o  many weapons, because  of  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  
l o c a t i o n ,  ownership  o r  o t h e r  c i r cumstances  have a  s t r a t e g i c ,  g e n e r a l  o r  worldwide 
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  as  t h e a t e r ,  s p e c i f i c  o r  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  focused a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
They do no t  f i t  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n t o  one o r  a n o t h e r  c a t e g o r y .  T h i s  i s  one of  t h e  main 
r e a s o n s  why i t  may become d e s i r a b l e  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  merge t h e  INF and START n e g o t i a -  
t i o n s .  
I n  t h e  meantime, i n c l u s i o n s  o r  e x c l u s i o n s  of  weapons from t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i l l  p robab ly  b e s t  b e  accomplished on s t r i c t l y  ad hoc  terms and by agreement c a s e  --
by c a s e  between t h e  p a r t i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  by a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  c r i t e r i a .  
D .  The Nuclear  Forces  o f  Grea t  B r i t a i n  and France  
Both Grea t  B r i t a i n  and France  have  m i s s i l e s  and bomber a i r c r a f t  t h a t  can 
s t r i k e  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y .  The S o v i e t  Union con tends  t h a t  t h e s e  two c o u n t r i e s  have 
t h e  fo l lowing  numbers o f  in te rmedia te - range  sys tems.  - 191 
Great  B r i t a i n  Number 
P o l a r i s  m i s s i l e s  
Vulcan bombers 
F rance  
Land-based m i s s i l e s  
Submarine-based m i s s i l e s  
Mirage-4 bombers 
191  The same numbers a r e  pub l i shed  by t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l .  I n s t i t u t e  o f  S t r a -  
t e g i c T t u d i e s  and o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  
NATO accepted a s  an element i n  i t s  n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  f o r  t h e  INF meetings 
t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French nuclear  fo rces  should be excluded. There were v a r i o u s  
reasons f o r  t h i s  s tand .  F i r s t ,  NATO took t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t s  dec i s ion  t o  deploy 
Pershing 2s  and GLCMs would be s t rong  enough t o  ga in  Sovie t  agreement t o  d ismant le  
SS-20s without p lac ing  o t h e r  forces  on t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  t a b l e .  Second, t h e  B r i t i s h  
and French Governments contend t h a t  t h e i r  nuc lear  arms a r e  s t r a t e g i c  weapons and 
a r e  not t o  be considered i n  t h e  same category a s  t h e  SS-20s. =/ Third,  t h e  U.S. 
contends t h a t  t he  B r i t i s h  and French systems a r e  "independent n a t i o n a l  systems," 
and t h a t  i t  i s  inappropr ia te  f o r  t he  U.S. and t h e  U.S.S.R. t o  n e g o t i a t e  over  t h e  
systems of t h i r d  coun t r i e s .  The U.S. " w i l l  not  agree  t o  inc lude  o r  compensate f o r  
B r i t i s h  and French forces  ," according t o  ACDA D i r e c t o r  Eugene Rostow, - 21/ 
The Soviet  Union has  conceded t h a t  B r i t a i n  and France need not  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
t h e  nego t i a t i ons  o r  s ign  an agreement but  has  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  armaments must 
be regarded a s  a  component of t he  balance.  Brezhnev g r a n t s  t h a t  they need not  be 
reduced--only t h a t  they  be taken  i n t o  account i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t .  "It i s  t h e  
o v e r a l l  r e s u l t ,  o v e r a l l  balance t h a t  i s  important t o  us," Rrezhnev has  a s s e r t e d  on 
t h i s  po in t .  
I f  East-West arms con t ro l  nego t i a t i ons  make progress  on t h e  intermediate-range 
and s t r a t e g i c  l e v e l s  t he  problem of determining how t h e  B r i t i s h  and French nuc lea r  
fo rces  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  agreed upon must be d e a l t  with a t  some po in t .  I n  
t h e  SALT nego t i a t i ons  t h e  Sovie ts  a t  t imes pressed f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  and 
French nuclear  armaments i n  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  balance and thus  i n  t h e  agreement hut  
when opposed by the  United S t a t e s  it conceded t h a t  they and o t h e r  U.S. and a l l i e d  
------- 
20/ See below, p.  33. -
21/ Statement t o  t h e  House Foreign A f f a i r s  Committee, February 23, 1982. -
2r;-rd-based systems" could  be l e f t  ou t  o f  t h e  SALT I1 T r e a t y .  It was contem- 
l a  Led ,  however, t h a t  i n  f u t u r e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  " t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  sys tems,"  would be  
' jcluded. NATO agreed  i n  i t s  December 1979 two-t rack d e c i s i o n  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
3n t h e  " t h e a t e r  ," l a t e r  c a l l e d  " in te rmedia te - range  , I f  sys tems would b e  pursued 
9ithi .a t h e  SALT framework. It was n o t  t h e n  f o r e s e e n  t h a t  t h e  SALT I1 T r e a t y  would 
I ?  r e j e c t e d ,  a s  i t  l a t e r  t u r n e d  o u t .  Now NATO and t h e  lJ.S. p l a n  t h a t  INF d i s c u s -  
. ions  s h ~ ~ l d  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  s t a g e s  and t h a t  B r i t i s h  and French f o r c e s  shou ld  not  be 
inc luded  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a g e .  Nor i s  t h e r e  anv i n d i c a t i o n  o f  whether o r  when they  
w i l l  be inc luded  i n  subsequent  s t a g e s .  Nor h a s  t h e r e  been any U.S .  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  
i t  plans  t o  t a k e  them i n t o  account  i n  t h e  START n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
The B r i t i s h  and French " E u r o s t r a t e g i c "  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  a r e  i n  f a c t  t a r g e t e d  on 
t h e  Sov ie t  Union and a r e  jo ined  t o  t h e  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  of t h e  1Jnited S t a t e s  by a  
z i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e .  I t  would be r e a s o n a b l e  t o  acknowledge t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
h a s  a  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t  i n  h a v i n g  them accoiinted f o r  i n  some way i f  agreements t o  
r educe  in te rmedia te - range  o r  s t r a t e g i c  armaments a r e  r e a l i z e d .  
I f  t h e  U.S. and t h e  NATO governments genu ine ly  i n t e n d  t o  ach ieve  n u c l e a r  arms 
r t37trol  agreement w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  Union based on an e q u a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  s e c u r i t y  
i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French f o r c e s  must be accounted f o r  i n  arms c o n t r o l  
- , ego t i a t ions  a t  some p o i n t .  A t  p r e s e n t  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  whether t h i s  might be i n  
' .? INF o r  START n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The S o v i e t  Union d u r i n g  t h e  many y e a r s  o f  n e g o t i a -  
t i o n ;  w i t h  t h e  U.S. on c o n t r o l l i n g  n u c l e a r  armaments h a s  t h u s  f a r  been concess ion-  
a :  i n  r egard  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French f o r c e s .  I t  cannot  be  expected t h a t  a s  
- g o t i a t i o n s  proceed it w i l l  i n d e f i n i t e l y  remain s o .  Th i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  s i n c e  
bo th  B r i t a i n  and France a r e  now s t r e n g t h e n i n g  and a r e  p lann ing  o t h e r  improvements 
t h e i r  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  t h a t  w i l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  number and accuracy  
of n u c l e a r  warheads t h a t  can s t r i k e  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. 
- 35 - 
E .  Submarine-sed Miss i l e s  -- 
Both s ides  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  Soviet  Union has  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  on submarines 
f o r  use i n  Europe but  d i f g e r  on t h e i r  number. The U.S. says 30 SS-N-5s, t h e  s o v i e t  
Union says 1 8 ,  The SS-N-5 has a rangq of about 700-800 miles  and a  one-to-two- 
megaton warhead. 
I n  .addi t ion t h e  Sovie t  Union c p r r e c t l y  counts  64 P o l a r i s  m i s s i l e s  on four  B r i -  
t i s h  submarinesr and 80 m i s s i l e s  on f i v e  Rrench submarines. The former have a  range 
, of 2500 mi les  with t h r e e  200* k i l o t o n  warheads each, and t h e  l a t t e r  a  range of 1600 
mi les  wi th  a megaton warhead. As mentioned previous ly ,  t he  U.S. c laims t h a t  t hese  
mbst be exdluded because t h e  U.S. cannot n e g o t i a t e  on behalf  of B r i t a i n  and France.  
I t  does not c laim t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  and French weavons a r e  not  t a r g e t e d  on the  
Soviet  Union o r  t ha t , . t hey  a r e  covered by any o t h e r  arms nego t i a t i ons .  
. The U.S. does not count two or- t h r e e  of i t s  Poseidon submarines ( 3 2  t o  48 mis- 
s i l e s )  assigned bo NATO f o r  t a r g e t i p g  because t h e s e  have been included i n  t h e  ca t e -  
-qb-ry 05 s t r a t e g i c  weapons t h a t  were t h e  s u b j e c t s  of SALT nego t i a t i ons  and presumably 
will h e  included i n  START nego t i a t i ons .  The Sovie t  Union does not  count them o r  any 
o f  i t s *  own s t r a t e g i c  submarine m i s s i l e s  f o r  t h e  same reason,  although a t  l e a s t  some 
of them t o o  might be t a rge t ed  on Europe. The dual s t a t u s  of SLBMs as  both t h e a t e r  
and s t r a t e g i c  weapons demonstrates the d i f f i c u l t y  of c l e a r l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between 
them f o r  arms c o n t r o l  purposes. 
V I I I .  The S h i f t  from a  Theater  t o  Intermediate-Range O r i e n t a t i o n  
A. The U.S. Pos i t i on  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  resumption a t  t h e  end of  November 1981 of 1J.S.-U.S.S.R. negot ia-  
t i o n s  on intermediate-range nuc lear  weapons, a  ba s i c  premise of  t h e  t a l k s ,  it 
appeared from publ ic  p re s s  r e p o r t s ,  was t h a t  t hey  cen t e r ed  on " thea t e r  nuc lear  
weapons," t h a t  i s ,  those  deployed i n ,  o r  i n  t he  v i c i n i t y  of Europe. Rut t h e  Reagan 
Adminis t ra t  ion changed t h e  pub1 i c  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  t a l k s  from a  " thea te r"  or ien-  
t a t i o n  t o  one cen te red  on c e r t a i n  weapon systems. Thus i t  changed t h e  t i t l e  of t h e  
nego t i a t i ons  t o  "intermediate-range forces"  (INF), without a  geographic l i m i t a t i o n .  
Reagan o f f i c i a l s  proposed t h a t  a l l  u n i t e  of t h e  SS-20 wherever deployed should 
be included i n  the nego t i a t i ons .  According t o  t h e  U.S.  argument even SS-20s de- 
ployed o u t s i d e  t h e  European U.S.S.R. i n  Soviet  Asia had a  range capable  of  s t r i k i n g  
many t a r g e t s  i n  Western Europe, o r  t a r g e t s  i n  Western o r  Eas t e rn  Asia ,  inc lud ing  
c o u n t r i e s  a l l i e d  with o r  f r i e n d l y  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  they were 
mobile and, no mat te r  where deployed, could be moved from where t hey  were t o  where 
they could s t r i k e  NATO coun t r i e s .  Eugene Rostow dec la red  t o  t h e  House Foreign 
A f f a i r s  Conanittee i n  February 1982 t h a t  "even those  (SS-20s) deployed i n  t h e  f a r  
e a s t e r n  pa r t  of t he  U.S.S.R. p resen t  a  t h r e a t  t o  t he  bas i c  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  of 
t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  t h e  Far  Eaet and t h e  Middle Eas t , "  and t h i s  was a v a l i d  rea- 
son f o r  b r ing ing  these  m i s s i l e s  under d i s cus s ion .  
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  U.S. p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  inc lud ing  t h e  SS-20 
should t ake  i n t o  cons ide ra t i on  not  only t h e  d i s t a n c e  t he  r e e n t r y  v e h i c l e s  can 
t r a v e l  from launcher t o  t a r g e t s  but a l s o  t h e  weapon's c a p a b i l i t y  of moving from 
p lace  t o  p lace .  These two f a c t o r s  t oge the r  could i n  e f f e c t  endow it with c e r t a i n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of an i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  range weapon. F i n a l l y ,  t he  c r i t e r i o n  of  
t h r ea t en ing  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  i n  geographic a r e a s  o t h e r  than Europe in t roduces  a 
complicat ing concept i n t o  t h e  nego t i a t i ons .  The n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  no longer  con- 
f i ned  t o  t h e  European t h e a t e r .  
The argument of t he  1J.S. regard ing  t h e  range /mobi l i ty  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  SS-20 
could l o g i c a l l y  be turned around by t h e  U.S.S.Q. t o  apply t o  a l l  Persh ing  2s  and 
t o  a l l  GLCMs, and indeed t o  a l l  1l.S. weapon systems with s i m i l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
The U.S.S.R. could fol low t h e  U.S. l ead  and contend t h a t  a l l  u n i t s  of  t h e s e  
weapons wherever they a r e  should be s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  agreed l i m i t a t i o n s .  
I f  t h e  Sovie t  Union appl ied  t h e  U.S. c r i t e r i a  t o  o t h e r  intermediate-range 
weapons--e.g. nuclear-capable  t a c t i c a l  bombers based on land  o r  sea--it  could 
l o g i c a l l y  maintain t h a t  a l l  of them wherever deployed, i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  
anywhere on t h e  globe,  should be  included because o f  t h e i r  mobi l i ty .  Such a i r -  
c r a f t ,  f o r  example, a r e  r o u t i n e l y  flown from t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  Western Europe, 
o r  t r anspo r t ed  t o  t h e  v i c i n i t y  of t h e  Sovie t  Union by nava l  a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r s .  
There would a l s o  be no l o g i c a l  reason why t h e  U.S. c r i t e r i a  could not  be  a p p l i e d  
t o  a l l  c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  based a t  s e a  (SLCMS) capable  of  reaching  Sovie t  t e r r i t o r y  
from an ad jacent  s ea  l o c a t i o n  and on v e s s e l s  anywhere possess ing  t h e  m o b i l i t y  t o  
move t o  such l o c a t  ions .  
I f  comprehensive agreements on s t r a t e g i c  weapons a r e  reached a t  some f u t u r e  
t ime,  i t  could be d e s i r a b l e  t o  seek r educ t ions  o r  l i m i t a t i o n s  on a l l  in te rmedia te -  
range nuc lear  weapons everywhere i n  t h e  world. Because of  t h e  sweeping n a t u r e  o f  
worldwide r e s t r i c t i o n s  and t h e i r  p o s s i b l e  impact on va r ious  r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  U.S. might p r e f e r  t o  adopt c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  and reduc- 
t i o n  of intermediate-range weapons l e s s  comprehensive i n  t h e i r  imp l i ca t i ons  than  
those  i n  c u r r e n t  p roposa ls .  
B . China and t h e  "Zero Option" 
The n o n - v i a b i l i t y  of t h e  U.S. "zero  op t ion"  i s  pe rce ived  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  i t s  
e f f e c t  on S o v i e t  deployments o f  SS-20s a g a i n s t  China. A s u b s t a n t i a l  pe rcen tage  
of S o v i e t  SS-20s a r e  t a r g e t e d  on China.  It is  o f t e n  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  about  one- th i rd  
(100)  a r e  t a r g e t e d  on China w h i l e  a n o t h e r  t h i r d  (100)  a r e  s t a t i o n e d  i n  West S i b e r i a  
w i t h  an o p t i o n  t o  t a r g e t  Europe o r  China.  The l a t t e r  h a s  a  number of  b a l l i s t i c  
n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e s  o f  v a r y i n g  ranges--probably a  hundred o r  more, and inc reas ing- -  
c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  t a r g e t e d  on t h e  e x t e n s i v e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. - 2 2 1  
The "ze ro  op t ion"  would d i s m a n t l e  t h e  S o v i e t  in te rmedia te - range  m i s s i l e s  deployed 
a g a i n s t  China but  would have no e f f e c t  on Chinese  m i s s i l e s  t a r g e t e d  on t h e  S o v i e t  
Union. It i s  no t  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  expec t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Government w i l l  a c c e p t  such 
a n  arrangement ,  ' a l though  i t  h a s  o t h e r  m i s s i l e s  and a i r c r a f t  t h a t  can s t r i k e  Chinese 
t e r r i t o r y .  
221 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  of  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  The M i l i t a r y  Ba lance ,  
l981--82, pp. 7 2 - 7 3 .  
X .  Short-Range Nuclear M i s s i l e s  i n  Europe 
Both NATO and t h e  S o v i e t  Union have deployed b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  w i t h  r a n g e s  
l e s s  t h a n  t h e  P e r s h i n g  2 and t h e  SS-4. These s h o r t e r - r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  a r e  r e l e v a n t  
because  t h e  S o v i e t  sys tems,  i f  t h e y  a r e  forward deployed,  can s t r i k e  some of t h e  
same t a r g e t s  i n  NATO t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  t h e  in te rmedia te - range  m i s s i l e s  can .  Like- 
w i s e ,  some NATO m i s s i l e s  can s t r i k e  Warsaw P a c t ,  bu t  n o t  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y .  
The S o v i e t  m i s s i l e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  SS-12/SS-22 and t h e  SS-X23. The SS-12 h a s  a 
range of 500 m i l e s  w i t h  a megaton warhead. The SS-22 i s  a somewhat longer-range 
v e r s i o n  (625 m i l e s )  w i t h  a s m a l l e r  y i e l d  warhead. The U.S. c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
about 100 SS-12/SS-22s. But t h e  S o v i e t  Union i s  r e p o r t e d  a s  s a y i n g  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  
h a l f  t h a t  many and t h a t  t h e  SS-22 does no t  e x i s t .  - 231 The SS-X23 i s  an  e x p e r i -  
mental  m i s s i l e  wi th  a range  p o s s i b l y  around 300 m i l e s .  It e v i d e n t l y  h a s  n o t  been 
deployed.  
Richard P e r l e  , A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  
P o l i c y ,  t o l d  t h e  Sena te  Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee i n  December 1981 t h a t  t h e  U.S. 
would a l s o  s e e k  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  SS-22 and SS-X23 m i s s i l e s .  Otherwise ,  h e  s a i d ,  
t h e  INF agreement would be " h o p e l e s s l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  c i rcumvent ion."  That would 
be  s o ,  h e  e x p l a i n e d ,  because  t h e  SS-22, i f  moved toward t h e  Warsaw Pact  f r o n t  l i n e ,  
cou ld  cover  "some 85 p e r c e n t  of t h e  NATO t a r g e t s  a s s i g n e d  t h e  SS-20," w h i l e  t h e  
SS-X23 could  s t r i k e  "as  much a s  50 p e r c e n t  of European NATO." 241 -
H e  d i d  no t  e x p l a i n  why t h e  omiss ion o f  Warsaw P a c t  nuc lea r -capab le  a i r c r a f t  
a s  w e l l  a s  submarine-based m i s s i l e s ,  would n o t  pe rmi t  c i rcumvent ion.  Nor why 
23/ The SS-22 i s  a NATO d e s i g n a t i o n .  The S o v i e t s  might look upon i t  a s  j u s t  
a v a r s t i o n  of t h e  SS-12, o r  a s  on ly  a t e s t  model. 
24/ Washington P o s t ,  December 2 ,  1981, A 2 2 .  -
weapon systems under the  NATO f l a g  t h a t  could s t r i k e  Warsaw Pact t e r r i t o r y  would 
not a l s o  permit circumvention. 
180 Pershing 1As a r e  c u r r e n t l y  deployed i n  Western Germany. They a r e  repor ted  
t o  have a range of about 400 mi les  and a warhead of v a r i a b l e  y i e l d s  from 60 t o  400 
k i l o t o n s .  The 108 of these  under U.S. command w i l l  be  replaced by the  Pershing 28. 
The 72 under Western German con t ro l  w i l l  remain and might be replaced l a t e r  by an 
improved Pershing 1. This l a t t e r  m i s s i l e  could s t r i k e  Warsaw Pact coun t r i e s  but 
not  the  Soviet  Union. 
The U.S. a s s e r t s  t h a t  t h e  SS-12/SS-22s should be counted among intermediate-  
range weapons. The Soviet  Union contends t h a t  they should not  because t h e i r  range 
i s  too sho r t .  However, t he  Sovie ts  count the 108 U.S.-commanded Pershing l A s ,  pre- 
sumably a s  sur roga tes  f o r  the  Pershing 2s scheduled t o  be deployed l a t e r ,  
The Soviet Union and the  U.S. possess  s h o r t e r  range mis s i l e s  o t h e r  than those 
mentioned he re in  but they have more the  cha rac t e r  of b a t t l e f i e l d  weapons. 
The claims t h a t  each s ide  makes regard ing  inc lus ion  i n  t h e  intermediate-range 
balance of weapons a t  the lower end of the  range s c a l e  point  up the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
of a r r i v i n g  a t  c l e a r  c r i t e r i a  f o r  i nc lus ion  of systems i n  t h e  arms c o n t r o l  nego- 
t i a t i o n s .  I n  order  t o  keep the  nego t i a t i ons  manageable i t  i s  necessary t o  place 
l i m i t s  s o  t h a t  the  numbers and v a r i e t i e s  of weapons do not become too  g r e a t .  In 
the  l a s t  a n a l y s i s ,  t h i s  can probably bes t  be achieved by agreement between the  two 
s i d e s  i n  regard t o  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s p e c i f i e d  weapon models r a t h e r  than by a r i g i d  ap- 
p l i c a t i o n  of genera l  c r i t e r i a .  
XI. Verification 
The Reagan Administration has made only general remarks about the kind of 
verification needed to assure compliance with an INF agreement. The kinds of 
monitoring required will depend on the limitations agreed upon, which are far ... 
from settled. 
The President and other Administration officials have repeatedly asserted that 
for the kinds of limitations and reductions they advocate, rnore than national tech- 
nical means (NTM) of monitoring will be necessary to assure the U.S. that the So- 
viets are complying. 
According to Eugene Rostow additional means could include "cooperatve mea- 
sures, data exchanges and collateral constraints." On-site inspection might or 
might not be necessary. 
Rostow told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23, 1982, that 
the U.S. would want to know about Soviet production of missiles and warheads, "We 
cannot confine ourselves just to what is deployed. After all the threat cannot 
be measured that way." Paul Nitze, U.S. Representative to the INF negotiations, 
affirmed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1982, that the U.S. 
proposal would also require a prohibition of production and testing of the missiles 
that would be banned under its terms. 
Rostow reminded the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1981 that in 
his Der Spiegel interview, Brezhnev had agreed in principle to cooperative means 
of verification to supplement NTM. Specifics of what would be appropriate could 
be worked out in negotiations. The Soviet Union had also affirmed this position 
in "diplmatic and official comunications," according to Rostow. There have also 
been other manifestations of Soviet willingness to consider methods of monitoring 
other than NTM provided they are appropriate to agreed linitations. 
m i l e  Rostow and o t h e r  U.S. o f f i c i a l s  have emphasize? t h a t  t h e r e  could  be 
requ i rements  f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  INF r e s t r i c t i o n s  beyond NTM, no such s p e c i f i c  
requirement  h a s  been made p u b l i c .  
However, Rostow t o l d  Congress t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  "zero o p t i o n "  c a l l s  f o r  a  
complete ban r a t h e r  than  j u s t  a  numerical  l i m i t a t i o n  "should e a s e  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
problem i n  any INF agreement."  Rostow r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  a  t o t a l  p r o h i -  
b i t i o n  s f  deployment o f  a  weapon system would make i t  e a s i e r  t o  d e t e c t  a  v i o l a t i o n  
t h a n  a  p a r t i a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  t h a t  l e f t  some u n i t s  of t h e  sys tem s t i l l  deployed.  
XII. Concluding Observations 
A, Strengths and Weaknesses of the  U.S. Pos i t ion  
The INF negot ia t ions  a r e  s t i l l  i n  an i n i t i a l  s tage.  Both s i d e s  have taken 
por i t ions  t h a t  a r e  one sided and a r e  accusing each o the r  of not  nego t i a t ing  seri- 
ously, r ee f ing  u n i l a t e r a l  advantage, and t r y i n g  t o  ga in  m i l i t a r y  super io r i ty .  I n  
shor t ,  each is s t i l l  i n  a  l a rge ly  propagandaraging,  r a t h e r  than a down-to-earth 
negot ia t ing  posture. 
This  is not unexpected. However, i n  so- r e spec t s  t h e  pressure  t o  achieve 
productive r e s u l t s  is g r e a t e r  on the  United S t a t e s  than i t  is on the  Soviet Union. 
The United S t a t e s  i s  working agains t  a  NATO-imposed deadline,  namely, the  end of 
1983, the  d a t e  vhen the  f i r s t  U.S. INF weapons a r e  scheduled t o  be deployed. The 
United S t a t e s  i s  a l s o  working agains t  another deadl ine ,  namely, the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n  of L984. The incumbent adminis t ra t ion  arguably has  a  f e s p o n s i h i l i t y  f o r  
achieving an arms contro l  agreement derived from i t s  repudiat ions of the  1979 SALT 
I1 Treaty. The l a t t e r  was the  product of seven years  of in tense  nego t i a t ions  bt- 
tween t h e  U.S. and the  Soviet Union, but the  Reagan Administration has ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
r a i d  t h a t  under current  circumstance# i t#  proporals  a r e  b e t t e r  ab le  t o  achieve 
U.S. a m 8  contro l  objec t  iver .  Moreover, i t  has claimed i t  can achieve an agreement 
by exerc is ing  pressure on the  Soviet Union through i t s  weapons programs. It i s  
r e o o n a b l e  t o  expect tha t  i t s  record on these  claims w i l l  be a  sub jec t  of debate 
i n  the-1984 p res iden t i a l  e l ec t ions .  
The United S t a t e s  negot ia t ing  pos i t ion  i s  handicapped insofa r  a s  t h e  Soviet  
Union a l ready has  i t s  weapon systems i n  place whereas the  weapons systems which 
t h e  United S t a t e s  has introduced i n t o  t h e  bargaining a r e  s t i l l  only a promiee, 
Another complication of major s ign i f i cance  is the  f a c t  t h a t  the  determination of 
sonc of its a l l i e s  t o  cooperate i n  t h e  deployment of the  promised weapon systems 
i s  rhaky and i n  constant need of reaf f i rmat ion .  
But d e s p i t e  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  and weaknesses a f f e c t i n g  t h e  U.S. p o s i t i o n ,  i t  
; ) as  t a k e n  a  bold  s t a n c e  by p ropos ing  t h e  "zero  opt ion" .  T t  h a s  proposed t r a d i n g  
o f f  t h e  e n t i r e  promised U.S. deployment a g a i n s t  t h e  e n t i r e  e x i s t i n g  S o v i e t  deploy- 
ment of  in te rmedia te - range  land-based b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s .  It h a s  done s o  on t h e  
premise  t h a t  i t s  b a r g a i n i n k  s t a n c e  i s  s t r o n g  because  t h e  S o v i e t  Union deep ly  f e a r s  
t h e  deployment o f  t h e  new weapons and w i l l  he  w i l l i n g  t o  pay a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p r i c e  
Q 
t o  h e ~ 6  i t  o f f .  While t h e  S o v i e t  Union knows t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  l a c k  o f  f i r m  suppor t  
ic some c o u n t r i e s  f o r  t h e  KIT0 p ledge t o  deploy t h e  in te rmedia te - range  systems i f  
no  arms c o n t r o l  agreement i s  a c h i e v e d ,  i t  a l s o  knows t h a t  a t t e m p t s  t o  t a k e  advan- 
t a g e  of t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  may no t  be  s u c c e s s f u l .  I t  i s  a l s o  aware t h a t  t h e  m i l i -  
t a r y  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and NATO, a s  f a r  a s  in te r rned ia te -  
range f o r c e s  a r e  concerned,  w i l l  be g r e a t l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  i f  t h e  new systems a r e  
I* 
deployed.  Yoscow knows t h a t  a f t e r  deployment occurs--and i t  cannot be s u r e  t h a t  
deployment w i l l  no t  m a t e r i a l i z e - - i t  w i l l  be i n  a  much weaker p o s i t i o n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
t h e  new b a l a n c e .  
S ince  t h e  INF sys tems (572)  dec ided  upon by NATO f o r  deployment d i d  no t  match 
. , * 
t h e  S o v i e t  systems e i t h e r  i n  range o r  number of  warheads,  some NATO o f f i c i a l s  never  
2 '  c o n s i d e r e d  them a s  meet ing a  ' 'zero op t ion"  s t a n d a r d .  They assumed t h a t  some com- 
- .  
promise 1eveS'would be agreed i n  U.S.-Scviet n e g o t i a t i o n s .  What compromise numbers 
1 ' 
ri5ght be a c c e p t a b l e  t o  bo th  s i d e s ,  however, i s  no t  e v i d e n t  a t  p r e s e n t .  
B .  Need f o r  ,Agreement on Data 
There  a r e  many weighty i s s u e s  t o  he r e s o l v e d  b e f o r e  bo th  s i d e s  can r e a c h  com- 
aon ground f o r  a  v i a b l e  agreement.  Nany, a l though  nQt a l l ,  a r e  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  
qbove d i s c u s s i o n .  A b a s i c  i s s u e  s t i l l  t o  be r e s o l v e d  i s , g @ e  achievement of  a n  
agreement t o  exchange b e t t e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on each side's r e l e v a n t  armamenLs.. U.S. - = 
o f f i c i a l s  have o f t e n  emphasized the  need f o r  b e t t e r  exchanges of d a t a  than  have 
occurred i n  t h e  pas t .  It i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t  i n  many cases  impossible ,  f o r  any 
sound agreement t o  be reached i f  e i t h e r  o r  both s i d e s  do not have r e l i a b l e  d a t a  
regard ing  t h e  weapon systems which a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t s  of t he  agreement. From t h e  
pub l i c  evidence, each s i d e ' s  knowledge of t h e  o t h e r ' s  weaponry, while  ex t ens ive  i n  
manv cases ,  shows gaps and con t r ad ic t ions .  
A notable  product of  the  p o l i t i c a l  in te rchange  between t h e  U . S .  and NATO on 
t h e  one s i d e  and the  Soviet  Union on t h e  o t h e r  over t h e  pas t  couple of years  i n  
regard t o  m a t t e r s  of arms con t ro l  and of j u s t i f y i n g  c e r t a i n  weapon deployments 
before  t h e  grandstand of pub l i c  opinion,  i s  t h a t  both s i d e s  have publ ished exten- 
s i v e  compendiums of information about opposing weapon systems. Even more note-  
worthy is t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Soviet  Union has ,  f o r  t he  f i r s t  t ime,  engaged i n  t h i s  
kind of publ ic  debate.  
Recently t h e  Sovie t  Union has volunteered i t s  own da t a  on Soviet  and Western 
forces .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  days of arms con t ro l  nego t i a t i ons ,  t he  Soviet  Union f requent -  
l y ,  i f  not  always, r e l i e d  on d a t a  suppl ied  by t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  o t h e r  Western 
pavers on nuc lear  weapons a s  t he  base l i n e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  nego t i a t i ons .  It d id  not  
o f f e r  information about i t s  own nuclear  weapons o r  i t s  e s t ima te s  of opposing arms. 
This  r e l i a n c e  upon Western information about nuc lear  armaments was overcome i n  t he  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h e  SALT I1 Treaty.  That was one of t he  b e n e f i c i a l  r e s u l t s  of 
those  nego t i a t i ons .  
According t o  t h e  terms of t h a t  t r e a t y ,  t h e  two s i g n a t o r i e s ,  t h e  Sovie t  Union 
and t h e  United S t a t e s ,  were p e r i o d i c a l l y  t o  publ ish f i g u r e s  on weapons t h a t  were 
s u b j e c t s  of t r e a t y  c o n t r o l s ,  The Soviet  Union a c t u a l l y  furnished two success ive  
s e t s  of d a t a  on i t s  own forces  before i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  would 
not r a t i f y  t h e  t r e a t y .  Now i n  two publications which have received wide d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n ,  t he  Soviet  Union has o f f e red  information about numbers and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of i t s  own weapon systems and of weapon sys tems possessed  by t h e  TJnited S t a t e s  and 
o t h e r  Western  powers. These d a t a ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  r e l e v a n t ,  a r e  b e i n g  
used i n  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  a l though  t h e r e  i s  obv ious ly  on ly  p a r t i a l  concur rence  
on t h e  f i g u r e s .  
Eugene Rostow, t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  ACDA, h a s  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union was 
pushed i n t o  p u b l i s h i n g  f i g u r e s  r e g a r d i n g  i t s  f o r c e s  by i t s  arguments t h a t  p a r i t y  
e x i s t e d  between t h e  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  of  bo th  s i d e s ,  bo th  on t h e  European and s t r a t e -  
g i c  p l a n e s ,  and t h a t  U.S. rearmament programs would upse t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  ba lance .  
However, t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s s u e d  by bo th  s i d e s  t o  s u p p o r t  i t s  c l a ims  shows 
c e r t a i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  and inadequac ies .  To c i t e  an  example, t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  on t h e  S o v i e t  SS-20, a  p r i n c i p a l  s u b j e c t  of  t h e  n e g o t i a -  
t i o n s ,  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  no t  a s  s o l i d  a s  it might be  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s e s s  p r e c i s e l y  i t s  
m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Although t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  community h a s  e v i d e n t l y  kep t  
t r a c k  of  t h e  number deployed,  t h e r e  appear  t o  be  d i f f e r e n c e s  of  o p i n i o n  i n  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  range of t h e  SS-20, p o s s i b l y  because, i t  h a s  been t e s t e d  i n  v a r i o u s  models 
and w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  numbers of  warheads.  It may n o t  be  a  f i r m  f a c t  t h a t  e v e r y  
u n i t  o f  t h e  deployed SS-20 h a s  t h r e e  warheads a l though  a l l  a r e  p u b l i c l y  counted a s  
i f  they  do. There  a r e  a l s o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  y i e l d  of  i t s  warheads.  
The d i s p u t e  t h a t  h a s  r e c e n t l y  e r u p t e d  between t h e  1J.S. and t h e  U.S.S.R. o v e r  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  whether  t h e  S o v i e t  Union h a s  o r  h a s  no t  completed a d d i t i o n a l  deployment 
s i t e s  f o r  t h e  SS-20 a f t e r  Moscow announced a  moratorium on t h e i r  deployment i s  un- 
u s u a l  and d i s q u i e t i n g .  The d i r e c t l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  s t a t e m e n t s  i s s u e d  by each s i d e  
sugges t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s e r i o u s  problem of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  d a t a  which is 
p u z z l i n g  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  and which m e r i t s  f u r t h e r  e x p l o r a t i o n  by t h o s e  concerned 
w i t h  t h e  adequacy o f  moni to r ing  p rocedures .  
I f  t h e r e  a r e  gaps  i n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  about t h e  SS-20, t h e  amount 
o f  r e l i a b l e  in fo rmat ion  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  SS-22 and t h e  SS-23  i s  meaqer indeed .  
The more re levant  of t hese  appears t o  be the  SS-22 because i t  has  a  longer  range 
and i s  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of the  SS-20 than e i t h e r  t h e  SS-21 or  t h e  SS-23. 
But t he re  appears  t o  be unce r t a in ty  whether o r  not  i t  i s  deployed and i f  so  i n  
what numbers. 
The amount of confusion t h a t  e x i s t s  i n  regard t o  intermediate-range a i r c r a f t  
on each s i d e  t h a t  a r e  capable of d e l i v e r i n g  nuc lear  weapons, i s  a l s o  ex t ens ive .  
Before t he  i s sues  i n  t h e s e  nego t i a t i ons  can he addressed i n t e l l i g e n t l y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  the  mat te r  of which systems should be included,  t h e r e  must be a  f r anke r  
exchange of information than has y e t  occurred.  Thus f a r  t h e  claims of both s i d e s  
have been so  exaggerated, each i n  i t s  own f avor ,  t h a t  it w i l l  presumably t ake  much 
d i scuss ion  and concession on both s i d e s  before  common understanding can he achieved.  
C .  Why t h e  "Zero Option"? 
How should one appra i se  t h e  f a r  reaching cha rac t e r  of t he  "zero opt ion" a s  it 
was proposed by the  Reagan Administrat ion? It could have been proposed i n  a  l e s s  
extreme £ o m ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  it might have appl ied  only  t o  t hose  intermediate-range 
m i s s i l e s  of  t he  Soviet  Union t h a t  a r e  deployed i n  Europe, t h a t  i s ,  west of t he  
Ura ls ,  or  a t  most those mis s i l e s  e a s t  of t he  Ura ls  with a  range s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
s t r i k e  NATO coun t r i e s  i n  Europe. O r  t h e  proposal  might have been made i n  terms of 
reducing intermediate-range miss i l e s  t o  some common l e v e l  g r e a t e r  than  zero ,  i n  
terms of e i t h e r  launchers o r  warheads. Why, t h e r e f o r e ,  was the  zero  opt ion  pro- 
posed i n  an extreme form a s  f a r  a s  intermediate-range m i s s i l e s  a r e  concerned with 
no fal l -hack p o s i t i o n ,  e i t h e r  acknowledged o r ,  according t o  c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  
evidence,  discussed with NATO a l l i e s ?  
There a r e  a  number o f  poss ib le  explana t ions ,  i nc lud ing  t h e  fol lowing.  F i r s t ,  
t he  proposal i s  a  hard opening p o s i t i o n  and the  Reagan Administrat ion in tends  t o  
barga in  s tubbornly f o r  a l l  o r  a s  much of  it a s  long a s  i t  can without making any 
concecs ions .  Second, t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  might have in tended  t o  h o l d  a  s t i f f  l i n e  
l w e i 1  t h e  START n e g o t i a t i o n s  cou ld  g e t  underway and bo th  s e t s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  
c m l d  be  c o o r d i n a t e d  more i n t e l l i g e n t l y  a f t e r  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  of  bo th  s i d e s  were on 
t h e  t a b l e .  T h i s  would have r e q u i r e d  j u s t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  "no concess ions"  
s t a n c e .  T h i r d ,  a n o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
a s s e s s i n g  t h e  s t a t e  o f  o p i n i o n  i n  Europe,  t h e  l a g g i n g  pace of  t h e  INF weapons 
programs, t h e  t ime  frame f o r  conduct of  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  1984 p r e s i d e n t i a l  
campaign, and o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  decided t h a t  t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  were a  l o s t  cause  
and t h a t  t h e y  would depend on t h e  START n e g o t i a t i o n s  a s  a  means o f  s c o r i n g  g a i n s  
i n  t h e  arms c o n t r o l  a r e a  b e f o r e  t h e  n e x t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign. Under t h i s  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  "ze ro  ~ p t i o n " ,  because  i t  h a s  a n  appea l  t o  impor tan t  arms c o n t r o l  
groups  i n  Europe,  would no t  e n t a i l  undue c r i t i c i s m  of  the  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i f  
i t  d i d  n o t  l e a d  t o  a  s u c c e s s f u l  agreement.  
S t i l l  a n o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d i d  no t  
r e a l l y  want t h e  INF n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o  go v e r y  f a r  v e r y  f a s t  b u t  p r e f e r r e d  t o  be  a b l e  
t o  deploy t h e  P e r s h i n g  2 s  and t h e  GLCMs because  it d i d  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  could  
win major c o n c e s s i o n s  from t h e  S o v i e t  Union on in te rmedia te - range  m i s s i l e s  u n t i l  
t h e  deployment of  t h e  U.S. sys tems had a t  l e a s t  begun. 
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  b e s t  nego- 
t i a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  f o r  b o t h  t h e  INF and START n e g o t i a t i o n s  would l i e  i n  a  merger 
o f  t h e  two i n t o  one.  The SALT 111 n e g o t i a t i o n s  were o r i g i n a l l y  env i s ioned  i n  t h e  
SALT I1 T r e a t y  a s  combining in te rmedia te - range  and s t r a t e g i c  weapons and Reagan 
o f f i c i a l s  might have dec ided  t h a t  t h i s  o p t i o n  should  be k e p t  open f o r  f u t u r e  d e c i -  
s i o n .  Under t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  adopted a n  u n y i e l d i n g  and compre- 
i;-.nsive "ze ro  o p t i o n "  s t a n c e  u n t i l  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  could  be nade.  
The f a c t  t h a t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Ambassador Edward Rowny, 
t h e  U.S. n e g o t i a t o r  f o r  START, have s a i d  they do not  expec t  much p r o g r e s s  i n  e i t h e r  
t h e  INF o r  START n e g o t i a t i o n s  u n t i l  t h e  deployment of Persh ing  2s and GLCMs beg ins ,  
suggests  an admin i s t r a t i on  dec i s ion  t o  adhere t o  i t s  opening proposa ls  i n  bo th  of 
t he se  n e g o t i a t i o n s  u n t i l  t h a t  event occurs ,  un less  t he  Sovie t  Union should o f f e r  
s i g n i f i c a n t  concessions.  It  a l s o  might sugges t  i t  expec t s  t h e  two s e t s  of nego t i a -  
t i o n s  t o  be merged a t  some po in t .  
D .  Re l a t i onsh ip  of INF t o  START Neogt ia t ions  
There a r e  a  number of pos s ib l e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between t h e  INF and START nego- 
t i a t i o n s .  
1. Comparative P r i o r i t y  
One f a c t o r  t h a t  can a f f e c t  the  impact of t h e  INF nego t i a t i ons  i s  t h e  compara- 
t i v e  p r i o r i t y  they a r e  given i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  START nego t i a t i ons .  There 
e x i s t s  a l r eady  a  widespread b e l i e f  i n  Western Europe a s  w e l l  as  among many observ- 
e r s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  would not  n e c e s s a r i l y  be a  r e l i -  
ab l e  a l l y  i f  t h e  Sovie t  Union should dec ide  t o  launch a  nuc l ea r  a t t a c k  s o l e l y  upon 
Western Europe. The United S t a t e s ,  many b e l i e v e ,  would not  n e c e s s a r i l y  extend i t s  
s t r a t e g i c  nuc lear  umbrella over  NATO Europe i f  such an onslaught  should t h r ea t en .  
This ,  a s  ha s  been explained i n  t h i s  paper and i n  many o t h e r  p l aces ,  was one of t h e  
main reasons f o r  t he  NATO d e c i s i o n  of  December 1979 t o  deploy intermediate-range 
m i s s i l e s  i n  Western Europe. 
Even now t h e r e  e x i s t s  some uneasiness  i n  Western Europe t h a t  with t h e  deploy- 
ment of intermediate-range m i s s i l e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h i s  deployment should be ex- 
panded l a t e r ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  might r e l y ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  u p m  
t h e  Europe-based nuc lear  m i s s i l e s  t o  r e t a l i a t e  a g a i n s t  a  Sovie t  nuc l ea r  a t t a c k  
be fo re  r e s o r t i n g ,  i f  i t  eve r  d i d ,  t o  a  s t r a t e g i c  nuc lear  response.  I f  now t h e  
United S t a t e s  should l ag  i n  reaching an agreement wi th  t h e  Sovie t  Union t o  l i m i t  
in termediate-range m i s s i l e s  i n  Western Europe and should g ive  p r i o r i t y  t o  t h e  
conclusion of a  START agreement wi th  t h e  Sovie t  Union, one s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t  
could be t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  f e a r s  of  Western Europeans t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  was 
reducing even more i t s  c a p a b i l i t y  of  extending a  s t r a t e g i c  nuc lear  defense t o  NATO 
Europe and i t  was l eav ing  Western Europe t o  r e l y  upon Europe-based U.S. nuc l ea r  
weapons and i t s  own resources  f o r  defense,  I n  o t h e r  words, i f  t h e  U.S. gave the  
conclusion of  a  START agreement p r i o r i t y  over a  s o l u t i o n  of  t he  intermediate-range 
weapon problem i n  Europe, i t  could have t h e  e f f e c t  of p o l i t i c a l l y  decoupling the  
U.S. s t r a t e g i c  d e t e r r e n t  from the-Europe-based nuc lear  d e t e r r e n t ,  t h e  very r e s u l t  
t h e  U.S. and NATO were t r y i n g  t o  avoid when they made t h e i r  December 1979 
dec i s ion .  
To avoid such an undes i rab le  consequence, t h e  United S t a t e s  could move ahead 
r a p i d l y  t o  reach an agreement on intermediate-range nuc lear  fo rces  wi th  t he  Soviet  
Union, e i t h e r  before  o r  a t  l e a s t  s imultaneously,  with an  agreement on s t r a t e g i c  
arms reduc t ions .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  would be t o  fo ld  t he  XNF nego t i a t i ons  i n t o  t he  
START n e g o t i a t i o n s  so t h a t  they would become one i n t e g r a t e d  d ip lomat ic  e f f o r t  
between the  U.S. and t h e  Sovie t  Union. 
Other observers  contend, however, t h a t  v i s i b l e  success  i n  t h e  START negot ia-  
t i o n s  before  s u b s t a n t i a l  progress  o r  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  conclusion of t h e  ZNF t a l k s  
occurred would have a  p o s i t i v e ,  encouraging e f f e c t  upon West European opinion.  The 
NATO governments and people would adjudge success  i n  START a s  an augury of success  
i n  the  INF nego t i a t i ons .  I t  would c r e a t e  an  atmosphere congenial  t o  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  
INF nego t i a t i ons  t o  advance toward an agreement. 
2 .  Coordination o r  Merger? 
From the  m i l i t a r y  viewpoint,  t h e  weapons t h a t  a r e  t he  s u b j e c t s  of t he  START 
and INF nego t i a t i ons  form a continuum of nuc lear  c a p a b i l i t i e s  from medium t o  long 
ranges and from small  t o  l a r g e  warhead y i e ld s .  I n  a  m i l i t a r y  sense,  no pa r t  of 
t h i s  a r r a y  o f  weaponry can  be  e x c l u s i v e l y  s e p a r a t e d  from t h e  r e s t  s o  t h a t  i t  c a n  
become an i s o l a t e d  means of w a r f a r e  i f  c o n f l i c t  e v e r  o c c u r r e d .  I n  t h i s  continuum 
t a r g e t s  can  he  s h i f t e d  from one c a t e g o r y  o f  weapon t o  a n o t h e r .  Consequent ly ,  un- 
l e s s  a l l  a r e  b rough t  under c o n t r o l ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  a  p o t e n t i a l  of  circum- 
v e n t i o n ,  I n  o r d e r  t o  cover  t h e  e n t i r e  continuum, t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  START and 
INF must be c l o s e l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  o r  i n t e g r a t e d .  
One approach t o  a s s u r i n g  c l o s e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  between t h e  START and INF a g r e e -  
ments ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  one n e g o t i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  aim of  r e a c h i n g  a  
s i n g l e  agreement ,  would b e  t o  make t h e  e f f e c t u a t i o n  of one agreement c o n t i n g e n t  
u w n  t h e  e f f e c t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  o t h e r .  T h i s  i s  n o t  an unprecedented d e v i c e  i n  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  diplomacy. 
One advantage o f  c l o s e l y  meshing o r  merging t h e  INF and START agreements  would 
be  t h a t  i t  could  o b v i a t e  c e r t a i n  d i s p u t e s  which have  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  such 
a s  t h a t  o v e r  t h e  B a c k f i r e  bomber a s  t o  whether o r  n o t  i t  q u a l i f i e d  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  
i n  t h e  SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  agreements  were c l o s e l y  c o o r d i n a t e d ,  t h e n  a  
sys tem l i k e  t h e  B a c k f i r e  would f a l l  i n  e i t h e r  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  and t h e r e f o r e  need 
n o t  b e  a m a t t e r  of  s e r i o u s  d i s p u t e .  Another advan tage  i s  t h a t  t h e  problem o f  
c i rcumvent ion  would b e  g r e a t l y  d imin i shed  o r  e l i m i n a t e d .  An a d d i t i o n a l  advan tage  
i s  t h a t  it would g r e a t l y  improve t h e  c e r t a i n t y  of  m i l i t a r y  p l a n n i n g  on each  s i d e  
i f  t h e  whole spec t rum of  n u c l e a r  weapons, e x c e p t  p o s s i b l y  t h o s e  a t  t h e  low end ,  
were s u b j e c t  t o  known r e s t r i c t i o n s  f o r  a  d e f i n e d  p e r i o d  o f  t i q e .  
A d i sadvan tage  of c l o s e l y  meshing o r  merging t h e  two agreements  i s  t h a t  more 
problems would have t o  be so lved  and t h e  pe r iod  of n e g o t i a t i o n  cou ld  become more 
ex tended .  One o f  t h e  advantages  o f  d i v i d i n g  up t h e  p r o c e s s  of n e g o t i a t i o n  and 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on a l i m i t e d  span o f  armaments f o r  each apreement i s  t h a t  t h i s  can  
s i m p l i f y  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
What i s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of  t h e  Reagsn A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  toward combining o r  a t  
l e a s t  meshing t h e  two s e t s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s ?  It h a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  p rocedures  which 
r e c o g n i z e  t h e  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  two n e g o t i a t i o n s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  
t h e r e  w i l l  be  o n l y  one backs top  committee i n  Washington t h a t  w i l l  he s u p p o r t i n g  
and g u i d i n g  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  two U.S. teams i n  t h e  two s e t s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
Second, bo th  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  Geneva where t h e  two d e l e g a t i o n s  
can  c l o s e l y  c o o p e r a t e  wi th  each o t h e r  and indeed might even combine t h e i r  opera-  
t i o n s  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s .  Eugene Rostow, D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  A r m s  C o n t r o l  and Dis-  
armament Agency, t o l d  t h e  House Fore ign  A f f a i r s  Committee i n  November 1981, " i t  
may be--I w o ~ l d n ' t  exclude it a t  a l l ,  depending upon how t h e s e  t a l k s  evolve-- that  
a t  a  g i v e n  p o i n t  we cou ld  combine them. A f t e r  a l l ,  t hey  a r e  s e p a r a t e  on ly  f o r  
r e a s o n s  of  h i s t o r i c a l  a c c i d e n t . "  
Apparen t ly ,  one of  t h e  main r e a s o n s  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a t  t h i s  t ime  
wants t o  keep t h e  two s e t s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  s e p a r a t e  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  each s e t  of 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  moment i s  focused o n l y  on a  l i m i t e d  number of  weapons 
sys tems and does  no t  i n c l u d e  a l l  weapons systems t h a t  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b a l -  
ance  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  sphere  o f  each n e g o t i a t i o n .  The U.S. i n  t h e  INF negot i a -  
t i o n s  wants t o  focus  on ly  on c e r t a i n  m i s s i l e s  and t o  exc lude  o t h e r  systems such a s  
a i r c r a f t .  I n  t h e  START n e g o t i a t i o n s  i t  wishes t o  g i v e  p r i o r i t y  t o  b a l l i s t i c  mis- 
s i l e s  and i t  i s  no t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  a t  what s t a g e  it h e l i e v e s  t h a t  a i r - b r e a t h i n g  
sys tems should  b e  brought  i n t o  t h e  p i c t u r e .  With p r o p o s a l s  l i k e  t h e s e  i t  would 
make l i t t l e  s e n s e  t o  combine t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  because  they  would l a c k  e s s e n t i a l  
l i n k a g e s  and would be  incomplete  even when added toge t ' ?e r .  But i n  t h e  f i n a l  
reckoning no n u c l e a r  arms c o n t r o l  s e t t l e m e n t  can be compLete u n l e s s  a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  
and r e l e v a n t  systems a r e  covered.  
